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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of televised executions occupies an odd position in the debate surrounding capital punishment. For, within
the debate concerning the pros and cons of the death penalty
itself, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment
have argued for televised executions. While those favoring televised executions hope to realize their potential deterrent value l
1. In the last decade, several studies have been conducted regarding the effect of
well-publicized executions. Compare David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effict o/Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980) (a
study concluding that the homicide rate drops after a well-publicized execution) and
Steven Stack, Publicized Executions and Homicide, 1950-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 532
(1987) ("On the average, a publicized execution story is associated with a drop of 30
homicides in the month of the story.") and Steven Stack, Execution Publicity and
Homicide in South Carolina: A Research Note, 31 SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 599
(1990) (homicide rate drops 17.5% in months with publicized executions) with William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A Monthly
Time-Series Analysis 0/ Execution Publicity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 722 (1989) (criticizing
the Stack study). For additional discussion of Phillips' study, see Wayne Kobbervig.
James Inverarity & Pat Lauderdale, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Comment on
Phillips, 88 AM. J. SOC. 161 (1982); Hans Zeisel, Comment on the Deterrent Effect 0/
Capital Punishment, 88 AM. J. SOC. 167 (1982) (critique of the Phillips study); David
P. Phillips, The Fluctuation 0/ Homicide After Publicized Executions: Reply to Kobbervig. Inverarity. and Lauderdale. 88 AM. J. SOC. 165 (1982); David P. Phillips. Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reply to Zeise/, 88 AM. J. SOC. 170 (1982). See also
William C. Bailey, Murder. Capital Punishment. and Television: Execution PubliCity
and Homicide Rates. 55 AM. SOC. REV. 628 (1990); ROBERT B. CIALDlNI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACfICE 141-43 (2d ed. 1988) (studies suggest an increase in
the rate of crime and violence following the broadcast of violent television shows or
movies); William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Capital Punishment and Non-Capital
Crimes: A Test 0/ Deterrence. General Prevention. and System-Overload Arguments, 54
ALB. L. REV. 681, 682 (1990) ("the analysis shows a significant inverse relationship
between the amount and type of television coverage devoted to executions and the
rates of assault, robbery and burglary"); David R. King. The Brutalization Effect:
Execution Publicity and the Incidence 0/ Homicide in South Carolina. 57 SOC. FORCES
683 (1978).
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or to provide broadcast news coverage of a significant public
event,2 those opposed to televised executions are worried that
such events will only "increase savagery" or "further coarsen
our society."3 Moreover, although some commentators are not
alarmed by the "executions-are-too-gruesome-for-TV" argument, 4 some death penalty opponents hope that "the spectacle
will so disgust the public that it will turn against capital
punishment. "S
Against this backdrop of public debate, several lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of laws which prohibit the filming of executions have been filed. 6 Among other things, these
challenges-brought by either death row inmates or journalists-have been based on the ground that the laws infringe upon
the First Amendment rights of the press. Although the United
States Supreme Court stated in dicta in 1890 that states may
restrict the attendance of reporters at executions,7 the Supreme
2. Michael Schwartz, T. V. in the Death Chamber: A News Story Like Any Other.
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at A30 ("[T]e1evision, used responsibly, can inform and
elevate public awareness and discussion of the most important issues facing our society."). But see Jonathan Sherman, Pictures At an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1991, at A31 ("The marginal informational benefit of televised executions ... would
be smalL").
3. Howard Rosenberg, TV: A Witness for the Execution, L.A. TIMES, May 19,
1990, at Fl (quoting University of California, Berkeley professor and media critic Ben
Bagdikian) (" 'increase savagery' "); George F. Will, Capital Punishment and Public
Theater, WASH. POST, May 12, 1991, at C7 ("[s]olemnity should surround any person's death, and televised deaths might further coarsen American life"); Anthony
Lewis, Their Brutal Mirth, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at A15 ("[Television] will
trivialize executions-reduce them to the level of entertainment, to be clicked on and
off."); see also Thomas Sowell, Televised Executions? Media Bias at 11, DETROIT
NEWS, July 22, 1991, at lOA ("The public has no more desire to see executions than
to see abdominal surgery.").
4. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at Fl.
5. Let TV Cameras Show Executions, USA TODAY, July 18, 1990, at 6A (opinion); Robert A. Harper, Jr., Seeing Death: Should Executions Be Public?, NEW
JERSEY L.J., April 12, 1990, at 9; Anna Quindlen, TV Executions Will Force Us to
Look Death in the Eye, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1991, Perspective Section, at 19. Compare Thomas Sowell, supra note 3, at lOA ("No doubt the whole point of televising
executions is to present a spectacle that will disgust the viewers and therefore undermine public support for capital punishment, which the political left has long opposed.") with David Wilkes, Televised Coverage Would End Executions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 1991, at A24 ("Televised coverage would serve as proof to those who are
ambivalent about the death penalty that state-sponsored executions should be relegated to the past.").
6. See infra Sections III and IV.
7. See Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890).
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Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether bans
on televised executions are constitutionally permissible.
In addressing this question, this Article considers the relationship between private execution laws and two groups - the
press and the general public. Part II of this Article discusses the
history of public executions, paying particular attention to the
United States. Part III examines the existing statutory schemes
of states which prohibit public executions. Part IV discusses
cases which have challenged private execution schemes, and
Part V explores freedom of the press jurisprudence. The use of
history in constitutional analysis is the focus of Part VI, while
Part VII analyzes the constitutionality of private execution statutes under various theories of constitutional analysis. Finally,
Part VIII integrates First Amendment jurisprudence with the
"evolving standards of decency" of Trop v. Dulles. 8
This Article concludes that under existing authority private
execution statutes are unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion, this Article first establishes that private execution laws
were originally enacted for paternalistic reasons and in response
to a powerful movement in the 1830s to abolish capital punishment. Tracing freedom of the press jurisprudence and the use of
history in the context of other cases involving constitutional interpretation, this Article then takes the position that the long
tradition of public executions in the United States and elsewhere
gives the public a constitutional right to view executions. In particular, this Article argues that an historical approach, when
coupled with the complete lack of governmental interests supporting modem private execution statutes, renders such laws unconstitutional because they impermissibly regulate the content of
speech. Furthermore, although First Amendment principles
generally give the press no greater right of access to events than
the general public, this Article asserts that because the public
has historically been allowed to witness executions, the press
must be given effective access to such events. Because television
is the most effective and influential medium of public information in the United States, this Article maintains that the press
must be allowed to televise executions.
Finally, this Article asserts that the public has a right to
8. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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view executions based upon the Eighth Amendment principle
that punishments not violate the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." In particular,
this Article contends that televised executions are necessary for
the Supreme Court to obtain an accurate measurement of society's evolving standards with respect to capital punishment.
That is, because the Supreme Court uses elected representatives
as the primary "objective indicia" of which punishments are
"cruel and unusual," the general public-who elect public officials or who authorize the death penalty via referendums-must
be allowed to view executions in order to be fully informed on
the subject of capital punishment. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the general public must be allowed to view executions in order for the Supreme Court to accurately determine
whether capital punishment is a "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment.
II.

HISTORY OF PUBLIC EXECUTIONS

Until the nineteenth century, executions in the United
States were held in public,9 often in the "public squares or commons."10 Following a well-established tradition of public executions in England,11 capital punishment in the American colonies
was administered before large crowds. 12 According to one account, at the last public hanging in Philadelphia, which took
place on May 19, 1837, an estimated crowd of 20,000 people
witnessed the execution of nineteen-year-old James Moran. 13 At
such events, religious and community leaders appeared in a pub9. G. Mark Mamantov, Note, The Executioner's Song: Is There a Right to Listen?, 69 VA. L. REv. 373, 375 (1983). The Massachusetts Bay Colony capital statutes
of 1641 were the first capital punishment laws in this country. THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 7 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
10. LoUIS P. MAsUR, RITEs OF EXECUTION 59 (1989).
11. DAVID D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD: THE PUBLIC EXECUTION CONTROVERSY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 1-27 (1974). Indeed, community involvement in executions has been traced back as early as 3000 B.C., when stonings
and executions were undoubtedly quite common. ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK
4, 6 (1990); see also JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1960)
(tracing the history of capital punishment).
12. See NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JACK H. HEDBLOM, HANG BY THE NECK 19-46,
59·63 (1967).
13. Id. at 34. Although Pennsylvania abolished public hangings in 1834, the victim had committed a federal offense-piracy-and was therefore not subject to the
Pennsylvania law. Id.
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lic ceremony to display their authority and convey their
messages to the crowd. 14 While the overarching civil theme of
execution day was the preservation of order, the primary spiritual message delivered concerned the consequences of crime and
sin. 15 Printed versions of the sermons and confessions helped
disseminate the execution day message throughout the crowd
and across the region. 16
During the 1830s, however, in response to a growing movement to abolish capital punishment, several states began to prohibit public executions. 17 In New York, in 1834, for example, an
assemblyman, Carlos Emmons, introduced a bill to abolish public executions. Initially, his idea met with bitter resistance from
two groups. IS One faction, viewing public executions positively,
felt that the practice should be continued. 19 The other group,
comprised of legislators who favored abolition of capital punishment altogether, rejected Emmons' proposal on Machiavellian
14. MASUR, supra note 10, at 26.
15. [d. at 26-27.
16. [d. at 26.
17. See Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America. 17871861. 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 33-34 (1957). According to one scholar, "[t]he move to
exclude the public from executions was apparently motivated by a desire to make
executions more civilized and by a fear that well-publicized executions would fan sentiment to abolish capital punishment altogether." Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375
(footnote omitted). The movement to abolish capital punishment in the United States
began in 1787 under the direction of Dr. Benjamin Rush. THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA, supra note 9, at 13.
Notably, Justice Marshall suggested that both the Civil War and the privatization
of executions may have halted much of the furor to abolish capital punishment: "But
the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor. One historian has said that '[a]fter
the Civil War, men's finer sensibilities, which had once been revolted by the execution
of a fellow being, seemed hardened and blunted.' " Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
338-39 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital
Punishment in America. 1787-1861. 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 46 n.64 (1957». Marshall
went on to state: "[E]xecutions, which had once been frequent public spectacles, became infrequent private affairs. The manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the punishment were. therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the
general public." Furman. 408 U.S. at 340 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
18. PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861, at 115-16 (1982). The
avowed pUrpose of Emmons' bill was to stop "the vicious assemblages and demoralizIng tendencies of public executions." [d. at 116 (footnote omitted).
19. [d. at 117. "At least two assemblymen thought that the public would not be
satisfied with private executions because they could not be sure that the hangings were
actually being carried out." [d.
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grounds. Assemblyman Samuel Bowne told the Assembly that
if executions were to exist at all, he wanted them to be public so
"that their consequences and enormity might be more vividly
impressed on the public mind. "20 According to Bowne, the disgust produced by public executions would lead "to the entire
abolition of capital punishment."21 Bowne's colleague, Amasa
Parker, concurred; he would vote against Emmons' bill because
"public executions would be ultimately instrumental in abolishing capital punishments."22
Although in 1834 Emmons' proposal was destined for failure,23 in 1835 a senate select committee of the New York legislature was directed to inquire "into the propriety of abolishing
public executions." The committee recommended that newspapers be used to disseminate information about executions.
Although very few people could obtain "ocular evidence" of a
private execution, the legislators reasoned that newspaper accounts of an execution attested to by "respectable citizens who
would attend the execution not as private spectators but as public witnesses" would protect against any "evasion, perversion, or
abuse."24 According to the New York committee report:
"[P]ublic executions ... are of a positively injurious and demoralizing tendency."2s Using phrenological principles,26 the report
mused whether those who attended executions were "of that
20. ld.
21. ld.
22. ld.
23. Emmons' bill failed to reach a final reading. ld.
24. MAsUR, supra note 10, at 115 (quoting Senate Document No. 79 in Documents of the Senate of the State of New York, Fifty-Eighth Session, 18354, 10 (1835)
[hereinafter Senate Report]).
25. ld. at 116.
26. By the time states began to abolish public executions, many Americans believed in phrenology, a psychological theory developed by two Austrian physicians,
Johann Spurzbeim and Franz Joseph Gall. Popularized in America by George
Combe, phrenology analyzed behavior "by viewing the brain as the mind's organ."
George Combe, who himself connected capital punishment with phrenology, stated
that the effect of witnessing an execution depended upon one's constitution. Arguing
that public executions would effectively deter only "all favorably constituted men,"
Combe reasoned that public executions would "operate with least effect precisely on
those on whom it is most needed, viz., on such as by nature and circumstance are most
prone to fall before temptation." MASUR, supra note 10, at 98. Horace Mann, a legislator from Massachusetts who first proposed the abolition of public executions in that
state, was so devoted to phrenology that he named a son after George Combe. ld. at
100; see also id. ("In the 1830s phrenology provided a compelling argument against
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class of citizens whose reason is to be convinced, or whose
animal feelings are to be excited."27 A month after the report,
the New York legislature adopted a private execution statute
which took effect on May 9, 1835.28
The private execution statutes enacted in the various state
legislatures generally provided for a limited number of witnesses
at executions and required the sheriff to provide an enclosure for
the event. 29 For instance, in Pennsylvania, where a private execution statute was enacted in 1834, the law required that an execution take place "within the walls or yard of the jail."30 Under
the Pennsylvania law, the sheriff had the discretion to select the
witnesses, providing that at least one physician, the attorney
general, and "twelve reputable citizens" be invited. In addition,
the law expressly prohibited minors from attending an
execution. 31
In general, states in New England were the first to enact
private execution laws, and states in the South and Midwest
public hangings at a time when social authorities increasingly feared a crisis of public
order.").
27. Id. at 116.
28. MACKEY, supra note 18, at 118. As Philip Mackey's historical study of New
York concluded:
The abolition of public hangings both hurt and helped the campaign to abolish all capital punishment. Just as Samuel Bowne and Amasa Parker had
feared, the removal of hangings from the public view almost certainly relieved the current pressure for total abolition. It decreased the supply of new
reformers by ending the recurrent scenes which had turned so many against
the death penalty. It also gave current reformers the impression that the
government had met them half way. These results were at least partially
responsible for the absence of anti-gallows activity during the 1836 and 1837
legislative sessions and the slow progress of the reform even later. On the
other hand, reformers after 1835 could claim that the abolition of public
hanging proved that the champions of the gallows were wrong and knew it.
As a proponent of the death penalty put it in 1848, the end of public execution "forced the suggestion that capital punishment was barbarous."
1d. at 119 (citation omitted).
29. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375. One author has noted that private executions "became a theatrical event for an assembly of elite men who attended the execution by invitation while the community at large was excluded." MASUR, supra note
10, at 111 (citing several examples); [d. at 112 ("Lucy Colman, anti-slavery lecturer
and women's rights activist, reported ... that at the execution of Ira Stout 'not one of
my sex was invited.' ").
30. Pub. Act No. 127, 1833-34 Pa. Laws 234-235.
31. 1d.; see also Journal of the Forty.fifth House of Representatives (Harrisburg,
1834), at 446-47; Report on the Expediency of Abolishing Public Executions (Harrisburg: Henry Welsh. 1833), at 4.
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soon followed. 32 However, because of lax enforcement and the
lack of proper facilities to provide private executions, private execution laws did not completely eliminate public access to executions. The end of public executions was not assured until state
governments took control of executions from the county sheriffs.
Although Maine, Michigan, and Vermont enacted such legislation in the 184Os, the majority of state legislatures did not assume control over executions until the early part of this
century.33
Four states, unsatisfied that even state-controlled executions would curtail public executions, imposed criminal penalties
for the publication of the details of an execution. 34 Minnesota's
private execution statute, enacted in 1889, was typical of such
statutes. According to the Minnesota law:
The warrant of execution shall be executed before the hour of sunrise of the day designated in the wauant and within the walls of the
jail in all cases where the jail is so constructed that it can be conveniently done therein; but when the jail is not so constructed, the
warrant shall be executed within an enclosure which shall be higher
than the gallows, and shall exclude the view of ~ersons outside, and
which shall be prepared for that purpose .... s

The statute also provided for witnesses to attend the execution.
The sheriff of the county was to be present, along with any assistants the sheriff deemed necessary. 36 Besides the sheriff and
his assistants, the following persons, but no others, were to be
present at the execution: a clergyman or priest, a physician or
surgeon, up to three persons designated by the prisoner, and up
to six other persons designated by the sheriff. 37 Although the
statute left witness selection at the discretion of the prisoner and
32. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375 & nn.19-20 (citing laws).
33. ld. at 377 & nn.26-28 (citing laws). Northeastern states were generally the
first to adopt state-controlled execution laws. The other state legislatures adopted
such measures as early as 1885, in the case of Ohio, and as late as 1956, in the case of
Louisiana. To date, only the states of Delaware and Montana do not require that
executions be under state control. ld. at 377 n.28 (citing laws and WILLIAM 1. BowERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 11 (1974».
34. Act of Feb. 15, 1913, Pub. L. No. 55, § 10, 1913 Ark. Acts 171, 174; Act of
Apr. 19, 1889, §§ 3, 6, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 118, 119-20; Act of Apr. 24, 1889, ch.
20, §§ 5, 6, 1889 Minn. Laws 66, 67; Act of Mar. 16, 1908, ch. 398, § 10, 1908 Va.
Acts 684, 686.
35. 1889 Minn. Laws, ch. 20, § 3.
36. ld. at § 2.
37. ld.
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the sheriff, the statute explicitly provided that "no person so admitted shall be a newspaper reporter or representative."38 Furthermore, Minnesota's statute provided that "[nlo account ofthe
details of such execution, beyond the statement of the fact that
such convict was on the day in question duly executed according
to law, shall be published in any newspaper."39 Any violation of
Minnesota's private execution statute was punishable as a
misdemeanor. 4O
Indeed, in 1906, an indictment was obtained against three
newspapers for publishing the details of what later proved to be
the last hanging in Minnesota. In that case, the three newspapers-including The St. Paul Pioneer Press - all published details of the hanging of William Williams, convicted of killing a
16-year-old boy and his mother. The strangulation of Williams,
which took fourteen-and-a-half minutes to complete because the
hangman failed to consider that both rope and the condemned's
neck stretches,41 ignited a movement in Minnesota to abolish
capital punishment, which ultimately succeeded in 1911.42
In the ensuing court case, State v. Pioneer Press CO.,43 the
Pioneer Press was fined twenty-five dollars.44 More significantly,
however, Minnesota's private execution statute was held constitutional by the Minnesota Supreme Court. According to the
court:
The evident purpose of the act was to surround the execution of
38. Id. at § 5.
39. Id. at § 5.
40. Id. at § 6. Minnesota's private execution statute was known as the John Day
Smith law in recognition of the legislator who originally sponsored the bill. A legislator from Minneapolis, Smith once tried-albeit unsuccessfully-to get Harry Hayward to pray with him on the evening of Hayward's hanging in 1895. WALTER N.
TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA: A COLLECTION OF TRUE CASES 164 (1985).
41. When the sheriff released the drop, Williams immediately hit the floor because
the rope was six inches too long. Three deputies, therefore, ran to the platform, pulled
on the rope, and held Williams' feet off the floor for fourteen and a half minutes until
he choked to death. After Williams was pronounced dead, spectators cut up the rope
for souvenirs. TRENERRY, supra note 40, at 163.
42. TRENERRY, supra note 40, at 156-67; Grant Moos, Newspaper Details of 1906
Hanging Made It State's Last, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 26, 1992, at 19A;
see also Black, Botched Execution Did in Death Penalty, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBONE, May 12, 1990, at 8A (although capital punishment was not abolished in Minnesota until 1911, successive governors commuted every death sentence imposed after
the botched execution).
43. 110 N.W. 867 (Minn. 1907).
44. TRENNERY, supra note 40, at 166.
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criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in order to avoid exciting an unwholesome effect on the public mind. For that reason it
must take place before dawn, while the masses are at rest, and
within an inclosure, so as to debar the morbidly curious. The
number of witnesses is limited to the minimum, and, to give further
effect to the purpose of avoiding publicity, newspaper reporters and
representatives of the press are prohibited, and the publication of
the event is limited to a mere statement of the fact that the execution took place. Publication of the facts in a newspaper would tend
to offset all the benefits of secrecy provided for, and therefore the
restriction as to publication has direct relation to and connection
with the other matters embraced within the act.4S

The court further stated:
The article in question is moderate, and does not resort to any unusual language, or exhibit cartoons for the purpose of emphasizing
the horrors of executing the death penalty; but if, in the opinion of
the Legislature, it is detrimental to public morals to publish anything more than the mere fact that the execution has taken place,
then, under the authorities and upon principle, the appellant was
not deprived of any constitutional right in being so limited. 46

Although Minnesota's private execution statute became moot after capital punishment was abolished in that state in 1911, the
law was repealed six years later out of concern that Williams'
hanging could have been concealed from the public.47
Notwithstanding the challenge to Minnesota's private execution law, every state permitting capital punishment eventually
adopted one type of private execution statute or another.
Although some statutory loopholes allowed sentencing courts to
order a public execution for prisoners convicted of certain
crimes such as rape,48 the last public execution in the United
States was carried out in Galena, Missouri on May 21, 1937.49
In the past few decades, public attitudes regarding public
executions have been varied. Although public opinion surveys
45. Pioneer Press, 110 N.W. at 868.
46. [d. at 868-69.
47. Moos, supra note 42, at 19A.
48. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 376-77.
49. Scott Armstrong, California Public-TV Station Seeks 'Live' Coverage of Executions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 10, 1991, at 4; see also Will, supra note 3, at
C7. Notably, it has been contended that the hanging of Rainey Bethea on August 14,
1936, in Owensboro, Kentucky was the site of the last public execution in the United
States. This contention is made on the grounds that the Missouri execution took place
inside a high stockade and only people with special passes were admitted.
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have shown scant support for televised executions, so both proponents and opponents of the death penalty have argued for a return to public executions. 51 In addition, several journalists and
death row inmates have taken legal action in an attempt to provide for televised executions. 52 Akin to the public executions in
the past, which inspired poetry and prose,53 these modem legal
actions have prompted enormous media attention,54 resulting in
50. For example, a poll taken at the time of Gary Gilmore's execution revealed
that 86% of those polled were opposed to viewing his execution on television. Tom
Matthews & Peter S. Greenberg, Gilmore's Countdown, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1977, at
35; The Harris Survey (Louis Harris & Associates, Inc.), cited in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 92. Among lawyers, a random sample of 600
lawyers found that 68% of lawyers felt executions should not be open to the public.
Lauren R. Reskin, Majority of Lawyers Support Capital Punishment, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1985, at 44.
51. See, e.g., Valerie Richardson, All Bets Off on Effect of Executions on TV,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at AI.
52. See infra Section IV.
53. In his novel, A Tale of Two Cities, for example, Charles Dickens describes
"Madame Defarge and her fellow 'knitting women' watching stoically as heads rolled
in Paris in the 18th century." Olson & Daly, Death on Video: Should Executions be on
the Eleven O'Clock News, Manhattan Lawyer, Apr. 1991, at 13; see also COOPER,
supra note 11, at 77-87 (discussing the role of Dickens in the public execution controversy in England). For a literary discussion of poetry on the subject of hanging in
England, see William B. Thesing, The Frame for the Feeling: Hangings in Poetry by
Wordsworth, Patmore, and Housman, in EXECUTIONS AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 17TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY: A COLLECTION OF EsSAYS 123 (William B. Thesing ed., 1990).
Notably, in American Notes, published in 1842, Dickens also wrote on the subject
of private executions:
The prison-yard ... has been the scene of terrible performances. Into this
narrow, g{'ave-like place, men are brought out to die. The wretched creature
stands beneath the gibbet on the ground; the rope about his neck; and when
the sign is given, a weight at its other end comes running down, and swings
him up into the air-a corpse.
The law requires that there be present at this dismal spectacle, the
judge, the jury, and citizens to the amount of twenty-five. From the community it is hidden. To the dissolute and bad, the thing remains a frightful
mystery. Between the criminal and them, the prison-wall is interposed as a
thick gloomy veil. It is the curtain to his bed of death, his winding sheet,
and grave. From him it shuts out life, and all the motives of unrepenting
hardihood in that last hour, which its mere sight and presence is often allsufficient to sustain. There are no bold eyes to make him bold; no ruffians to
uphold a ruffian's name before. All beyond the pitiless stone wall is unknown space.
CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 63 (1842).
54. See Nightline: Making the Death Penalty Visible (ABC television broadcast,
May 24, 1991).
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an "L.A. Law" episode55 and a movie. 56 The issue of televised
executions has also sparked debate among American newspapers, legal periodicals and civil rights organizations. 57
On the legislative front, attempts have been made to mandate televised executions. For example, in California, a bill
which would require a warden to allow the media to be present
at an execution and to televise it if the person being executed
agreed, was introduced twice in a five month period. The first
vote on the legislation, taken in May 1991, failed by a vote of
twenty-four to thirty-seven. The second vote on the measure,
taken in September 1991, failed by a vote of twenty-eight to
forty, falling thirteen votes short of the forty-one votes needed
for passage.
According to newspaper reports, each time the measure was
heard it prompted "spirited debate." Assembly member Stan
Statham and other Republicans who back capital punishment
opposed the bill, while liberal Democrats, who oppose the death
penalty, supported it. According to Statham: "There is a hidden agenda to this bill and that is to eliminate capital punishment as a law in California." However, Statham said he could
support the proposal if re-enactments of the crimes committed
by persons being executed were also shown. "If we're not forced
to see the crime, we shouldn't be forced to see the execution," he
said. On the other side of the aisle, Assembly member John Burton, the bill's author, said that although he opposes the death
penalty, he does not know what reaction televised executions
would provoke. 58 "I have no idea how this issue will cut, but I
55. The "L.A. Law" episode depicted a man dying in a gas chamber. Howard
Rosenberg, TV: A Witness for the Execution, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at Fl.
56. The movie, "Somebody Has to Shoot the Picture," stars Roy Scheider, who
plays a burned-out photographer hired by the condemned man to take his picture at
the moment of execution. Ray Loynd, 'Shoot the Picture' Graphic on Death Row, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990, at F13 (review).
57. See generally Patrick D. Philbin, Comment, ''Pictures at an Execution," 9
CoOLEY L. REv. 137, 137 & nn.4-8 (1992) (citing articles and disputes within two
organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty, over whether executions should be televised); see also Jef I.
Richards & R. Bruce Easter, Televised Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Public Hangings, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 420 n.169 (1992) (noting dispute within the
Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association).
58. Greg Lucas, Televised Executions Bill Dies: Assembly Votes It Down for a Second Time, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 4, 1991, at A14.
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believe people have a right to see [executions]," Burton said. 59
There has even been activity in the United States Congress
concerning public executions. In 1991, Senator Mark Hatfield
of Oregon proposed legislation to require public executions for
any sentence of death imposed under federal law. 60 While the
bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 23,
1991,61 no further action was taken in Congress that year.

III.

CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES

Private execution statutes and implementing regulations fall
into three general categories regarding the admission of witnesses to executions. 62 First, in three states - Indiana, Wyoming, and Tennessee - statutes only allow persons either picked
by the condemned or acting in an official capacity to witness the
execution. 63 Thus, in both Indiana and Wyoming, aside from
the warden and other official witnesses, only ten friends or relatives of the condemned prisoner may be invited by the condemned to witness the execution. 64 In Tennessee, aside from the
official witnesses, only members of the condemned's family may
be present to witness the execution. Furthermore, it is a Class C
misdemeanor in Tennessee for the warden of the state penitentiary to permit any person or persons, other than someone au59. [d.; see also TV Bill Killed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. Although similar
bills were under consideration in Florida and Georgia, no actions were taken in 1991.
Bill Halldin, House Panel Foresees Call for TV Executions, TAMPA TRIB., July 9,
1991, at 1; 1991 Ga. H.B. 110, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Bills File (introduced to House Committee on State Institutions and Property on January 15, 1991).
60. S. 1155, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Jonathan Sherman, Pictures At an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A31 ("In 1985 ... Senator Mark Hatfield of
Oregon suggested that the public would turn against the death penalty once it peered
into the execution chamber.").
61. 137 CONGo REC. S6667 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
62. See generally Mamantov, supra note 9, at 378-80. Three states with capital
punishment statutes, Delaware, Idaho, and Washington, do not have private execution statutes that fit into one of these three categories. While the Washington statute,
which states that executions must be conducted in private, does not specify who can
attend such executions, the Idaho statute does not specify at all who can be in attendance at an execution. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1990); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2716 (1987). The Delaware statute permits the sentencing court to set the
execution conditions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1987).
63. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-116
(1982); WYo. STAT. § 7-13-908 (1987 and Supp. 1992).
64. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1985); WYo. STAT. § 7-13-908 (1987
and Supp. 1992).
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thorized by statute, to witness an execution. 6s
Second, twelve private execution statutes require that a
given number of witnesses attend an execution, although they
are silent regarding who those witnesses may be. These provisions generally require the warden or superintendent of the state
prison to select the witnesses,66 although some state laws do not
specifically delegate this task to anyone. 67 A majority of these
statutes specifically authorize the condemned prisoner to invite
friends or relatives to be present at the execution. 68
Finally, the least restrictive type of statutes or regulations
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4O-23-116(b) (1982).
66. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) (superintendent shall invite "at least
twelve reputable citizens of his selection"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-404 (1990)
("such guards, attendants, and other persons as the executive director or his designee
in his discretion deems desirable, not to exceed fifteen persons"); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992) ("with the approval of the superintendent, not more
than three other persons"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992)
(chief administrative officer of the correctional facility shall invite "at least twelve
reputable citizens, to be selected by him"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989) ("such
other persons, not exceeding six in number, as the warden may designate"); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 176.355 (1991) (director of the department of prisons shall invite "not
less than six nor more than nine reputable citizens"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:6
(1986) ("the sheriff of the county in which. the person was convicted ... may admit
other reputable citizens not exceeding 12"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie
1984) (warden must invite "at least twelve reputable citizens, to be selected by him").
67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987) ("At the execution there
shall be present ... a number of respectable citizens numbering not fewer than six (6)
nor more than twelve (12)."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(d) (Smith-Hurd
1990 & Supp. 1992) (the execution shall be conducted in the presence of "6 other
witnesses who shall certify the execution of the sentence"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:570 (West 1992) ("not less than five nor more than seven other witnesses"); MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 73 (1992) (an execution shall take place in the presence of "a
number of respectable citizens numbering not less than six or more than twelve");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5) (1987) ("[t]he warden must allow the execution to
be observed by 12 witnesses"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983) ("At such execution
there shall be present ... six respectable citizens ..."); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234
(Michie 1991) ("At the execution there shall be present ... at least six citizens who
shall not be employees of the Department.").
68. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) ("superintendent shall ... permit
. . . any persons, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the execution"); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 3605 (West 1993) ("any persons, relatives or friends, not
to exceed five"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992) ("the immediate
members of the family of the prisoner" can be present); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740
(Vernon 1992) ("any person, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at
the execution"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5) (1987) (three witnesses "may be
designated by the person to be executed"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989) ("such
other persons, not exceeding three in number as the prisoner may designate"); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984) ("any person, relatives or friends, not to exceed
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specifically authorize press attendance at executions. However,
of the states that allow media attendance,69 no state has a statute
or regulation explicitly authorizing the audio or video recording
of an execution. Indeed, many states in this category specifically
prohibit such audio-visual reproduction. 70 In this least restrictive type of regulatory scheme, several states specifically permit
relatives or friends of the condemned person to be present at the
execution,71 while other statutes do not specify which witnesses
five"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983) ("any relatives of such person, convict or
felon").
69. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(6) (1982) ("Such newspaper reporters as may
be admitted by the warden ...."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985)
("[R]epresentatives of not more than five newspapers in the county where the crime
was committed, and one reporter for each of the daily newspapers published in the
city of Hartford."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922:11(2) (West 1985) ("Representatives of
news media may be present under rules approved by the Secretary of Corrections.");
FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. ch. 33.15.001 (1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-431.250
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) ("[N]ine (9) representatives of the news media
.... "); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992) ("[B]ona fide members of the
press, not to exceed eight (8) in number ...."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(c) (West
SUpp. 1992) ("The commissioner shall permit eight representatives of the news media
to be present at the execution ...."); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(F) (Baldwin
1992) ("Representatives of not exceeding three newspapers in the county where the
crime was committed, one reporter for each of the daily newspapers published in the
city of Columbus, and such other representatives of the news media as the director of
rehabilitation and correction authorizes."); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015 (West 1986) ("[N]ewspapermen from recognized
newspapers, press, and wire services, and radio reporters ...."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("not more than six duly accredited representatives of the
daily newspapers ...."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) ("[A]
group of not more than five representatives of the South Carolina media .... "); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-34 (1988) ("[A]t least one member of the news
media ...."); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979); Texas Department
of Corrections, Policy No. 1-82 (1982) (cited in Mamantov, supra note 9, at 380 n.37);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(4) (1990) ("[N]ine members of the press and broadcast
news media . . . provided that the selected news media members serve as a pool for
other members of the news media as a condition of attendance.").; cf KQED Inc. v.
Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323, 2326, No. C-90-1383 RHS (June 17, 1991)
(in California, journalists cannot be barred from the execution chamber); 1963-64
Ops. Ga. Att'y Gen. 346 (if the condemned person should express a desire to have
some member of the press present, the department would be legally authorized to
admit him).
70. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 33.15.002 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16431.250 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp.
1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54(B) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992); Texas Department of Corrections, Policy No. 1-82 (1982) (cited
in Mamantov, supra note 9, at 380 n.37); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(5)(a) (1990).
71. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(7) (1982) ("Any of the relatives or friends of the
condemned person that he may request, not exceeding five in number."); CONN. GEN.
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can be present at the execution.72
Notably, most states with private execution statutes specifically permit a priest, minister, or religious representative of the
condemned to attend the execution. 73 The condemned's attorney has the right to attend a client's execution in some states. 74
STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985) ("such other adults, as the prisoner may designate,
not exceeding three in number"); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990) ("the convicted
person may request the presence of ... a reasonable number of relatives and friends,
provided that the total number of witnesses appearing at the request of the convicted
person shall be determined by the commissioner of corrections"); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 16-431.250 (MichielBobbs Merrill Supp. 1992) ("three (3) other persons selected by the condemned"); MIss. CoDE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992) ("the commissioner may permit two (2) members of the condemned person's immediate family
as witnesses, if they so request"); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(E) (Baldwin
1992) ("not more than three other persons, to be designated by such prisoner"); OHIO
ADMIN. CoDE § 5120-9-54(A)(6) (1989) ("[t]hree persons designated by the prisoner
who are not confined in any state institution"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015
(West 1986) ("any persons, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, as the defendant
may name"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-35 (1988) ("any relatives or
friends requested by the defendant not exceeding five"); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979) ("any of the relatives or friends of the condemned person
that he may request, not exceeding five in number"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1911(2)(d) (1990) (friend or relatives "designated by the defendant, not exceeding a total
of five persons"). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(d) (West Supp. 1992) ("The
commissioner shall not authorize or permit any person who is related by either blood
or marriage to the sentenced person or to the victim to be present at the execution
").
.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("six reputable adult citizens
selected by such warden"); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) ("a
group of not more than two respectable citizens ••• designated by the commissioner").
73. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(4) (1982); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705
(1989); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3605 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 922:11(2) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-431.250 (MichielBobbs
Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:570 (West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 73 (1992); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MISS.
CoDE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon Supp.
1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:6 (1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983); OHIO
REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(E) (Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-954(A)(5) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015 (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D.
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-35 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4O-23-116(b)(3)
(1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 7719-11(2)(d) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Michie 1991); WYo. STAT. § 7-13908 (Supp. 1992).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 922:11(2) (West 1985); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990); MD. ANN. CODE art.

....
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Some states' statutes expressly prohibit minors from witnessing
an execution. 75 In other states, convicts are expressly prohibited
from witnessing an execution,76 or the identity of executioners is
protected by statute. 77 In one state, it is a misdemeanor to have
photographic or recording equipment at the execution site while
the execution is taking place,78 while in another state it is illegal
to print or publish the details of an execution; only the fact that
the criminal was executed can be printed or published. 79
27, § 73 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Michie 1991). Cf. N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 630:6 (1986) (sheriff has the discretion to admit the condemned prisoner's
counsel).
75. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) ("nor shall any minor be allowed to
witness the execution"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (West Supp. 1993) ("nor can any
person under 18 years of age be allowed to witness the execution"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985) ("such other adults, as the prisoner may designate"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:570 (West 1992) ("No person under the age of
eighteen years shall be allowed within the execution room during the time of execution."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("no person under twentyone years of age shall be allowed to witness the execution"); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 176.355 (1991) (director of the department of prisons shall invite "not less than six
nor more than nine reputable citizens over the age of 21 years, to be present at the
execution"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("six adult citizens");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984) (no person "under age" is allowed to
witness an execution); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("six reputable
adult citizens selected by such warden"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(7)(b) (1990)
("Any person younger than 18 years of age may not attend."). Cf. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-36 (1988) ("The warden ... shall not permit the presence of
any person under the age of eighteen years, unless a relative, and no relatives of tender
years shall be admitted.").
76. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(b) (1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2949.25(E)
(Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54(A)(5)-(6) (1989); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979).
77. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:49-7(a) (West Supp. 1992). For example, according to the Illinois private
execution statute:
The identity of executioners and other persons who participate or perform
ancillary functions in an execution and information contained in records
that would identify those persons shall remain confidential, shall not be subject to disclosure, and shall not be admissible as evidence or be discoverable
in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency,
or person. In order to protect the confidentiality of persons participating in
an execution, the Director of Corrections may direct that the Department
make payments in cash for such services.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(5)(b) (1990).
79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-504 (Michie 1987) ("No newspaper or person shall
print or publish the details of the execution of criminals under §§ 12-28-102, 16-90SOl, 16-90-502, and 16-90-505. Only the fact that the criminal was executed shall be
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CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE EXECUTION STATUTES

Federal Challenges

In deciding Garrett v. Estelle,80 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to
address the question of whether a state can prohibit the filming
of an execution. 81 In Garrett, the plaintiff, a television reporter,
requested permission from the Texas Department of Corrections
to film the first execution in Texas since 1964 and to film interviews with condemned prisoners then confined on "death
row."82 Rejecting these requests, Texas officials cited Article
43.1783 and Article 43.2084 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proceprinted or published."); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(I) (1987) ("No execution of
any person convicted in this state of a capital offense shall be public; but it shall be
private. Any officer convicted of violating this subdivision shall be fined in any sum
not less than one hundred dollars ($100)."). A statute repealed in the State of Washington in 1982 considered the publication of the details of an execution as obscenity
and made such publication punishable as such. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 9.68.020 (West 1988) (noting the law was repealed by 1982 Wash. Laws, ch. 184,
§ 11 (effective April 1, 1982».
80. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). For a thorough discussion of the Ga"ett case, see Comment, Broadcasters' News-Gathering
Rights Under the First Amendment: Garrett v. Estelle, 63 IOWA L. REv. 724 (1978)
and Katherine A. Mobley, Case Note, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1031 (1978). For a
compelling argument that Ga"ett was wrongly decided, see Jerome T. Tao, Note,
First Amendment Analysis ofState Regulations Prohibiting the Filming of Prisoner Executions, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042 (1992).
81. Ga"ett, 556 F.2d at 1275.
82. Id. at 1276.
83. Article 43.17 provides that:
Upon the receipt of such condemned person by the Director of the Department of Corrections, the condemned person shall be confined therein until
the time for his execution arrives, and while so confined, all persons outside
of said prison shall be denied access to him, or her except his or her physician and lawyer, who shall be admitted to see him or her when necessary to
his or her health or for the transaction of business, and the relatives, friends
and spiritual advisors of the condemned person, who shall be admitted to see
and converse with him or her at all proper times, under such reasonable
rules and regulations as may be made by the Board of Directors of the Department of Corrections.
Ga"ett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.2.
84. According to Article 43.20:
The following persons may be present at the execution: the executioner, and
such persons as may be necessary to assist him in conducting the execution;
the Board of Directors of the Department of Corrections, two physicians,
including the prison physician, the spiritual advisor of the condemned, the
chaplains of the Department of Corrections, the county judge and sheriff of
the county in which the Department of Corrections is situated, and any of
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dure, neither of which specifically authorized a reporter to :film
executions or to film interviews with inmates. Furthermore, in
denying the television reporter's requests, Texas officials relied
on a "media policy"85 regarding executions that had been developed by the Texas Department of Corrections. 86
In holding in Garrett that a television reporter has no right
to film Texas executions, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected
three arguments made by the reporter. First, the court rejected
the contention that Garrett could find his right to :film executions in the First Amendment. 87 Relying on the Supreme
Court's decisions in the companion cases of Pell v. Procunier 88
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 89 which held that the government is not required to give the press special access to information not shared by the public generally, the Garrett court stated
that "the first amendment does not invalidate nondiscriminatory
prison access regulations."90 According to the Fifth Circuit,
"Despite the unavailability of film of the actual execution the
public can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas need not be
inhibited. "91
Second, the Fifth Circuit in Garrett summarily rejected
Garrett's argument that the state's prohibition of his filming of
executions denied him equal protection of the law, as other
members of the press were allowed to utilize their "usual reporting tools. "92 According to the court:
The Texas media regulation denies Garrett use of his camera, and it
also denies the print reporter use of his camera, and the radio rethe relatives or friends of the condemned person that he may request, not
exceeding five in number, shall be admitted. No convict shall be permitted
by the prison authorities to witness the execution.
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.2.
85. Among other things, the "media policy" stated that "[n]o recording devices,
either audio or video, [shall] be permitted either in the execution chamber or monitor
room." Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.l. The policy further provided that "[n]o video
tapes shall be made from the monitor system." Id.
86. See Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276; see also Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468,
469-70 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing the development of the Texas "media policy").
87. Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1279.
88. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
89. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
90. Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1278.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1279.
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porter use of his tape recorder. Garrett is free to make his report by
means of anchor desk or stand-up delivery on the TV screen, or
even by simulation. There is no denial of equal protection. 93

Lastly, the Fifth Circuit in Garrett rejected the notion that
the proposed closed circuit television broadcast of the execution
was a "publication." Discarding this "prior restraint" attack on
the Texas media regulation, the court merely stated that
"[a]ccess for the purpose of filming is not provided, and the first
amendment does not require that it be provided."94
In marked contrast, the judgment of the federal district
court in Garrett 9S - which the Fifth Circuit reversed - would
have given the press a First Amendment right to televise executions. Describing capital punishment as "the ultimate act" of
the state,96 the lower court in Garrett would have permitted at
least one television reporter with a camera to witness every execution. 97 Regarding such televised executions, the district court
stated:
It is argued that such broadcasts would be an "offense to human
dignity," "distasteful," or "shocking." This may well be true, but
the question here is whether such decisions are to be made by government officials or by television news directors. The state says, in
effect, that "We, the government, have determined that the governmental activity in this instance is not fit to be seen by the people on
television news." In addition to being ironic, such a position is dangerous. If government officials can prevent the public from witnessing films of governmental proceedings solely because the
government subjectively decides that it is not fit for public viewing,
then news cameras might be barred from other public facilities
where public officials are involved in illegal, immoral, or other improper activities that might be "offensive," "shocking," "distasteful" or otherwise disturbing to viewers of television news. 98

Ultimately, the lower court in Garrett would have relied on the
"people themselves" to shield themselves from unacceptable reports by using "selective television viewing. "99
Paralleling the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Garrett, the
93. ld.
94. ld.
95. Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274
(5th Cir. 1977).
96. ld. at 471.
97. ld. at 472.
98. ld. at 472-73 (footnote omitted).
99. ld. at 473.
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court in Kearns-Tribune v. Utah Board of Corrections 100 also rejected the notion that the press has an affirmative right to attend
executions. 101 In noting that Utah law denied the general public
the right to attend executions,102 the court framed the issue as
"whether the plaintiffs have a constitutional right of access to
attend and report on the actual execution of Gary Mark Gilmore. ulO3 As did the Fifth Circuit in Garrett, the court in
Kearns- Tribune cited Pell and Saxbe to conclude that the plaintiffs had no First Amendment right to attend executions. 104
Likewise, the court in Kearns-Tribune also rejected a challenge
to the Utah statute under the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to "institutional discipline,"
"security," and "reasonable deference to the privacy of the condemned manu as rational concerns, lOS the court concluded:
The plaintiffs have not established any grounds to justify "strict
scrutiny" of this state legislation. The court, therefore, has applied
a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine whether the Utah statute in
question unconstitutionally excludes the plaintiffs from attendance
at the Gilmore execution. The plaintiffs have not met their burden
that [the Utah statute] lacks a rational basis. 106

More recently, KQED San Francisco, one of the largest
public television stations in northern California, sued the state of
California to allow photographic coverage of the execution of
Robert Alton Harris.107 The original lawsuit contended that
100. 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1353 (D. Utah 1977).
101. [d. at 1353.
102. The actual statute provided:
The warden must invite the presence of a physician and the county attorney
of the county; and he shall, at the request of the defendant, permit such
ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two, as the defendant may name, and
any persons relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the execution, together with such peace officers as he may think expedient to witness
the execution. But no other persons than those mentioned in this section
shall be present at the execution, nor shall any person under age be permitted to witness the same.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-18 (Supp. 1975).
103. Kearns-Tribune, 2 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) at 1353.
104. [d. at 1353-54.
105. [d. at 1354.
106. [d.
107. Lance Williams, Trial to Open on Executions on TV, San Francisco Examiner,
Mar. 24, 1991, at AI. For further discussion regarding the suit by KQED, see Steve
Keeva, Watching a Killer Die: California TV Station Sues to Televise Execution,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 24.
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Daniel Vasquez, San Quentin's warden, had unlawfully discriminated against broadcasters when he ruled in 1990 that only
newspaper reporters could watch the execution of Harris, who
later won a stay of execution. 108 Indeed, before a bench trial was
scheduled to begin on March 25, 1991, United States District
Court Judge Robert Schnacke had "rejected a bid by state authorities to dismiss the suit, saying there must be 'appropriate
balancing' between concerns over security and privacy surrounding an execution and the rights of a free press."l09
However, a week before the bench trial was scheduled to
begin, San Quentin's warden barred all journalists from attending future executions. 110 This action, which reversed the
prison's long-standing policy of allowing journalists without
cameras or recorders to witness executions,lll prompted Judge
Schnacke to declare, on the first day of trial, that KQED's suit
against California might be moot. In a preliminary finding,
Schnacke said that he was "quite satisfied that neither the press
nor the public has a First Amendment right" to attend
executions. 112
Without issuing a definitive ruling, however, Judge
Schnacke began the trial and frequently questioned KQED news
108. Williams, supra note 107, at At.
109. Philip Hager, Trial Ordered Over Right to Televise Executions, L.A. TI¥ES,
Nov. 10, 1990, at A26. According to the news report, State Deputy Attorney General
Karl Mayer defended the ban on televised executions to protect the "identities of correctional staff members, inmates' relatives or other witnesses who might later be subject to harassment or threats." Id. Conversely, in court briefs, KQED attorney
William Bennett Turner argued "that with modem technology, a camera could record
an execution unobtrusively and that the public had a right to view the event as the
'ultimate sanction' of the criminal justice system." Id. For a recent law review article
written by the two attorneys for KQED, see William Bennett Turner & Beth S.
Brinkmann, Televising Executions: The First Amendment Issues, 32 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 1135 (1992).
110. Williams, supra note 107, at A23.
lIt. Philip Hager, Trial Tests Media's Right at Executions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1991, at A3. Although California's Penal Code requires only that "at least [twelve] 12
reputable citizens" of the warden's choosing attend an execution, California has an
unwritten policy of admitting up to twenty-five journalists at executions. See Mamantov, supra note 9, at 379 n.37 (citing letter from Phillip Guthrie, Assistant Director for Public Information of the California Department of Corrections, stating that
California's unwritten policy of admitting up to 25 media representatives may be formally implemented).
112. Rosenfeld, Judge Frowns on TV Deaths, San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 26,
1991, at A2.

378

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

director Michael Schwarz. l13 At one point, for example, in addressing a comment to Schwarz, Schnacke remarked that recording sound in the execution chamber would make the film
"much more dramatic."114 He continued: "That's what you're
hoping for .... It would be much more saleable."llS In reply,
Schwarz said that KQED's motives were journalistic, not commercial. When Schnacke asked further who would be the
"supreme arbiter" of good taste in the film's airing, Schwarz answered, "the public."116 Nevertheless, Judge Schnacke suggested that the public would probably exercise poor taste in
watching executions. He noted that "[s]omeone once said that
no one went broke underestimating the taste of the American
people." 117
On the second day of trial, a former California prison director, Raymond Procunier, testified for KQED. Procunier testified that there was no reason to bar the media from covering
executions. He noted that "[c]orrections people have a tendency
to set moral standards and meddle in areas that are none of their
business." In addition, Procunier stated that prison officials'
concerns that a broadcast journalist might hurl a camera against
the gas chamber windows "bordered on the bizarre." I 18 On the
issue of inmate reaction to televised executions, Procunier suggested that watching such executions would not make inmates
more unruly than if they read newspaper accounts, and that inmates would not be more inclined to retaliate against prison
officials. 119
113. Id. Schwarz said the station planned to film inmates' faces during the 10 to 15
minutes it takes the poison gas to kill them, and would air the film late in the evening
to avoid young viewers. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Rosenfeld, Ex-state Prison Head Backs Using Cameras at Executions. San
Francisco Examiner, Mar. 27, 1991, at A7. When Deputy Attorney General Karl
Mayer asked Procunier whether a camera could crack the gas chamber windows,
Judge Schnacke interjected that "there may be such a thing in this world as a suicidal
cameraman." Id. Responding to Mayer's concern, however, Procunier replied that a
camera stand could easily be secured to the floor. Id. Procunier also added that reporters are often allowed to bring cameras on prison tours and that, in his 43 years in
corrections, no camera operator has ever attempted to hide contraband in equipment.
Id.
119. Id.
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On the next day of the trial, the warden of San Quentin,
Daniel Vasquez, countered with testimony of his own. According to Vasquez, televised executions should be banned for a
"host" of reasons. 120 First, Vasquez feared that televised images
of the dying would cause "radicals" to identify guards and take
revenge. "If we're talking about taking the lives of human beings, I'm afraid that some radicalism might be directed against
my staff," he said. 121 Second, Vasquez stated that the presence
of cameras in the execution chamber would disrupt the "decorum" of the proceedings. Suggesting that a cameraman might
even throw a camera against the gas chamber's windows, Vasquez asked: "What if he decided he was going to throw it
against the glass? What if there was something in it and he was
going to throw it and try and stop the execution?"122 Finally,
contradicting Procunier's testimony of the previous day, Vasquez suggested that executions agitate inmates. In particular,
Vasquez testified that "it was a lot more tense" throughout San
Quentin before Robert Alton Harris' execution which was
scheduled to occur in April 1990. Vasquez warned that inmates
could identify prison staff members from television and then retaliate against them, either inside the prison or through friends
on the outside. 123
Ultimately, before a filled courtroom, Judge Schnacke announced that California authorities could bar cameras from the
gas chamber since they pose a risk to prison security.124 In particular, Judge Schnacke said that testimony from the March trial
convinced him that the television broadcast of an execution,
even if it was broadcast some time after the actual event, could
lead to prison riots. Still photographs or a live broadcast seen by
inmates with television sets could spark "a severe reaction/' he
said. 125 Moreover, Schnacke feared that cameras might reveal
120. Rosenfeld, Warden Afraid of Revenge on Guards if Executions on TV; San
Francisco Examiner, Mar. 28, 1991, at AS.
121. ld. Vasquez made this remark after noting that "in this day and age" animal
rights activists had burned a barn merely because its owner raised veal. ld.
122. ld.
123. ld.
124. Philip Hager, u.s. Judge Upholds Ban on TV Cameras at Executions, L.A.
TIMES, June 8,1991, at AI. For an article asserting that theKQED case was wrongly
decided, see Jeff Angeja, Note, Televising California's Death Penalty: Is there a Constitutional Right to Broadcast Executions?, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 1489 (1992).
125. Hager, supra note 124, at A25.

380

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

the identities of guards and other staff members, thereby jeopardizing their safety and the safety of their families. 126 In addition, Schnacke added that photographers' heavy equipment
could also be used to break the glass shielding the gas chamber
at San Quentin, noting that "[t]he warden is not required to
trust anybody. It's no answer to say the press are all nice people
and would never do anything irrational."127 Thus, in echoing
nearly all of the concerns of the San Quentin warden at the
March trial, Judge Schnacke handed the warden broad discretion. "[p]rison officials are the experts," he stated. "Their reasonable concerns must be accommodated. They not
unreasonably see risks permitting cameras. Prohibition of cameras is a reasonable and valid regulation."128
However, Judge Schnacke also decided that rules barring
126. Judge Schnacke expressed the view that "no rational way appears to prevent
cameras that are [at an execution] from getting either intentionally or inadvertently
photographs of the prison personnel." KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2323, 2326 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
127. Hager, supra note 124, at A25.
128. Rick DelVecchio, Judge Upholds Ban on Cameras at Executions, S.F.
CHRONICLE, June 8,1991, at Ai. In KQED, it was alleged that the process for selecting execution witnesses in California was unconstitutional based upon the well-established rule that a law which "vests unbridled discretion in a government official over
whether to permit or deny expressive activity" is invalid on its face. Plaintiff's Trial
Brief at 2, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C90-1383RHS (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988) and Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969». Although the California law gave the warden
the discretion to choose any "reputable citizens" to witness the execution, the San
Quentin warden in KQED allowed the Governor's Press Secretary, Robert Gore, to
select the press witnesses. Perhaps the most questionable move on Gore's part was to
add to the favored list the politically conservative Sacramento Union, one of the few
news organizations that had not even requested a permit to witness Robert Alton
Harris' execution. In so doing, Gore passed over The Sacramento Bee, a paper with
four to five times the circulation of The Sacramento Union. Although Gore testified
that he couldn't recall why he favored the Union over the Bee, he admitted that he was
"well aware" of the "extremely negative" columns being written about the Governor
by the Bee's political columnist. It was undisputed that Gore's primary job was to get
favorable press coverage for the Governor and his programs. Plaintiff's Post-Trial
Brief at 21-22, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal.
1991 No. C90-1383RHS); see also id. at 13 (one of the warden's criteria for selecting
non-press witnesses was their disinclination to talk with reporters). Notwithstanding
the actions of Gore, Judge Schnacke found that the method of selecting media representatives was "reasonable and appropriate." KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2323, 2327 (N.D. Cal. 1991). This issue is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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all reporters from executions were "irrational and capricious."129
"The press has always been there, and the First Amendment
makes it pretty clear it is important to have a process of news
gathering," Judge Schnacke said. Adding that the warden's action in barring all press attendance from executions "was more
emotional than rational,"130 Judge Schnacke emphasized: "It
does appear that where there is a long custom and practice of
accommodating. the press, and where that has not caused any
intrusion of any sort . . . it is probably irrational, unreasonable
and capricious to bar the press at this point."131 On September
4, 1991, KQED announced that the station would not appeal
Judge Schnacke's ruling. 132
129. Katherine Bishop, Judge Upholds Ban on Videotaping of Executions at San
Quentin, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1991, at 9.
130. ld.
131. Hager, supra note 124, at At.
132. TV Bill Killed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. Although Judge Schnacke's
ruling was not appealed, a videotape of Robert Alton Harris' execution was made,
pursuant to court order, for the purpose of determining whether California's use of the
gas chamber is a "cruel and unusual punishment." Although various news organizations have suggested that the videotape constitutes an official record that must be
made available to the public, the Harris videotape is currently being stored in a federal
court vault. Philip Hager, Should Tape of Harris Execution Be Released?, L.A.
TIMES, May 10, 1992, at A3; William Carlsen & Harriet Chiang, Harris Death Video
Could be Made Public, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 23, 1992, at At. In an unrelated case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently rejected an attempt to videotape
an execution for the purpose of assisting in the assertion of a claim that the punishment of electrocution violates the eighth amendment. See Alan Cooper, 4th Circuit
Rejects Electrocution Challenge, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 7.
The controversial appellate process that resulted in the execution of Robert Alton
Harris, which took place early in the morning on April 21, 1992, was recently the
subject of a series of essays in The Yale Law Journal See Stephen Reinhardt, The
Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 219
(1992); Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution ofRobert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and
Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 267 (1992). The
UCLA Law Review also recently published a series of articles about the Robert Alton
Harris execution. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark C. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons
from the Robert Alton Ha"is Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992); Charles M. Sevilla
& Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The Death
Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345 (1992). For a first-hand
account of the execution of Robert Alton Harris, see Michael Kroll, The Unquiet
Death of Robert Ha"is, UTNE READER, Nov.lDec. 1992, at 92 (reprinted from THE
NATION (July 6, 1992».
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State Challenges

In Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 133 a journalist asserted that he had the right to attend and videotape an execution
based upon several provisions of Washington State's constitution. 134 Despite the court's finding that films convey substantive
information that cannot be conveyed by other forms of media,
the Washington Supreme Court rejected the journalist's claim,
finding that nothing in the history or the wording of the Washington Constitution provided a "theoretical basis" for the journalist's contentions. Therefore, the court dismissed the
journalist's petition against the state officials. 135
Likewise, although no judicial opinion appears to have been
written on the subject, in May 1990 a Virginia judge denied a
request by death row inmate Joseph J. Savino for a public execution. 136 "If you're asking me to make a decision at this level [on
a televised execution], I deny such a request," Bedford Circuit
Judge William Sweeney told Savino. 137 Savino, convicted of killing his gay lover, had written a letter to Sweeney asking that his
execution be televised. In Savino's words: "I would like to say
that since my trial and everything else was public, that my exe133. 783 P.2d 1065 (1989) (en bane).
134. The journalist attempted to ground a right to attend the execution on Wash.
Const. art. 1, § 30: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny others retained by the people." West's RCWA Const. Art. 1,
§ 30 (1988), Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1066. However, the court cited a Washington case,
State v. Clark, 71 P. 20 (1902), noting that "Clark says nothing about executions, or
about whether attendance at an execution is the type of 'fundamental, inalienable
[right] under the laws of God and Nature' which is protected under Const. art. I,
§ 30." Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1066.
The journalist also sought to find a right to videotape an execution in Wash.
Const. art. 1, § 5: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right." Id. However, the Washington Supreme
Court noted a " 'substantial difference between the right to publish already acquired
information and the right to attend a proceeding for the purpose of news gathering.' "
Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1067. In the court's eyes, therefore, it followed that "a taping
ban is a limitation on access to substantive information, not a limitation on dissemination." Id.
135. Id. at 1068 (citation omitted). One commentator has noted that the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Garrett is inconsistent with the reasoning of Halquist. See Tao,
supra note 80, at 1045-65 (noting that the Halquist court found execution films to
convey substantive information while the Garrett court found that such films were
only one form of reporting that could accurately describe an execution).
136. Public Execution Denied, WASH. POST, May 24, 1990, at C4.
137. Id.
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cution be made public . . . . I think it should be if it's to be a
deterrence to anyone else."13s Another death row inmate's assertion that he had a First Amendment right to have his execution televised was rejected in Florida because of procedural
deficiencies. 139

v.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court has decided several cases which address the scope of the rights of the press in a democratic society.
For purposes of delineating the press' right to televise executions, this section discusses case law in three arguably analogous
areas: (1) access to trials, (2) cameras in the courtroom, and (3)
access to prisons. The constitutional basis for finding a right to
televise executions is the subject of Section VII of this Article.

A.

Access to Trials

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia,14O the defendant's attorney in a criminal prosecution for
murder made a pre-trial motion requesting that the proceedings
be closed to the public. 141 When the prosecutor offered no objection, the court summarily ruled " 'that the Courtroom be kept
clear of all parties except the witnesses when they testify.' "142
Later in the day, however, Richmond Newspapers sought a
hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order, and the trial
judge granted the request. At that hearing, Richmond Newspapers argued that no evidentiary findings had been made by the
court prior to the closure order and that the court had failed to
consider any less drastic measures to protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial. 143 Despite these considerations, the trial
138. ld.
139. Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 635-36 (Fla. 1982). For an argument that
private execution statutes deprive death row inmates of their First Amendment rights,
see Roderick C. Patrick, Note, Hiding Death, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CoNFINEMENT 117 (1992).
140. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
141. ld. at 559. From a procedural standpoint, before defense counsel requested
that the proceedings be closed to the public, the defendant in Richmond Newspapers
was about to be tried for the fourth time. The previous trials had resulted in a conviction reversed on appeal and two mistrials. ld.
142. ld. at 560 (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close Trial to the Public 4-5).
143. ld. at 560.
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court sided with the defendant and ordered the trial to continue
the following day" 'with the press and public excluded.' "144
In what was hailed as "a watershed case" by Justice Stevens,145 the United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court
in Richmond Newspapers. Specifically, the Court held that a
state trial judge's order closing a murder trial from public access, at the request of the accused, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, of the seven Justices who
recognized a constitutional right of access in Richmond Newspapers, six arrived at their decisions through separate opinions.
Justice Powell took no part in the case, leaving Justice Rehnquist as the sole dissenter.
An opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, in which Justices White and Stevens joined, announced the judgment of the
Court in Richmond Newspapers. To begin his analysis, Burger
distinguished the case of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 146 which
held that members of the press have no "enforceable right of
access to a pretrial suppression hearing."147 Then, tracing the
history of trials back to the days before the Norman Conquest,148 Burger concluded that "the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open."149 Burger further emphasized the "significant community therapeutic value"150 and the "prophylactic
purpose"151 of open trials. "The crucial prophylactic aspects of
the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no
community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a comer [or]
in any covert manner.' "152
144. Id. at 561 (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Vacate 27).
145. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
147. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564 (emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 565.
149. Id. at 569.
150. Id. at 570.
151. Id. at 571.
152. Id. (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 184, 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959». Chief Justice Burger
also noted that "[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id. at 572.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that, "for
the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press ... .mS3 Thus,
Justice Stevens concluded that the record disclosed no justification for the closure order, and that, therefore, the order violated
the First Amendment. ls4 Justice White concurred with Chief
Justice Burger on the First Amendment issue, noting the case
could have been avoided if Gannett had construed the Sixth
Amendment "to forbid excluding the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances."ISS
In sharp contrast, Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers would have given the First Amendment a
"structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government."ls6 According to one commentator,
this view of the First Amendment would "protect the free discourse necessary for self-government."ls7 In Brennan's words:
"Implicit in this structural role is not only 'the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,' but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public
debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be informed."lss However, because Justice Brennan's approach
would have made a constitutional right of access "theoretically
endless," he proposed two limitations on that right.ls9 First,
"the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from
an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information."I60 Second, press coverage must serve
the purposes of the particular governmental proceeding. 161
153. ld. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. ld. at 584.
155. ld. at 582 (White, J., concurring).
156. ld. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
157. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 386.
158. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 550, 587 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964». According to Justice Brennan: "[P]ublic access to court proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our system, because 'contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse
of judicial power •.. .''' Id. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948».
159. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 386.
160. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 589, 593-97.
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The two other opinions in Richmond Newspapers were written by Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist. Concurring, Stewart remained convinced that the right to a public trial should be
rooted in the Sixth Amendment,162 but he was "driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must
provide some measure of protection for public access to the
trial."163 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, reframed the issue; instead of focusing on the freedom of the press to override the
defendant's right to a fair trial, he asked whether any provision
in the Constitution could prohibit what the Virginia judge did in
Richmond Newspapers. Rehnquist concluded that no such prohibition could be found. 164
B.

Cameras in the Courtroom

Among legal commentators, the question of whether trials
should be televised has drawn considerable debate. 165 As one
commentator has pointed out, in the context of televised coverage, "the issue of the proper balance between rights of a free
press and the right to a fair trial implicates the first, fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."166 While the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed the issue of whether absolutely denying the
press televised access to trials is consistent with the First
Amendment,167 the Supreme Court has handed down two cases
related to the issue of televised coverage of trials.
The Supreme Court first considered the implications of televised coverage of trials in Estes v. Texas. 168 In that case, Billy
Sol Estes, a much-publicized financier, was convicted of swin162. ld. at 603 (Stewart. J.• concurring).
163. ld. at 604.
164. ld. at 606 (Rehnquist. J.• dissenting).
165. Richard H. Frank. Cameras in the Courtroom: A First Amendment Right of
Access, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 749. 752 & n.15 (1987).
166. ld. at 752 (footnotes omitted).
167. Several lower courts have concluded that television access to trials can be
absolutely denied consistently with the first amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
Hastings. 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.). reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 704 F.2d 559,
cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System.
Inc.• 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v.
Edwards. 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of these cases. see Frank.
supra note 165. at 765-772.
168. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).

Number 3]

TELEVISED EXECUTIONS

387

dling after a trial of great notoriety which was broadcast on television over Estes' objection. 169 In narrowly reversing Estes'
conviction, the Supreme Court held that the television coverage
of Estes' trial deprived him of his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 17o While Justice Harlan's swing vote
in Estes remains controversial among commentators,171 a majority of the Court in Estes emphasized the disruptive nature of the
television coverage in reversing Estes' conviction. l72 In reaching
this narrow decision, the Court emphasized: "When the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without their present hazards to a fair trial we will have
another case."173
In 1981, the Supreme Court again considered the implications of electronic coverage in deciding Chandler v. Florida. 174
In that case, the Court stated that television coverage of trials is
not per se unconstitutional. 175 Indeed, "[a]bsent a showing of
prejudice" to the defendants in Chandler, the Court was unwilling to invalidate Florida's rule allowing television coverage of
169. ld. at 535-38.
170. ld. at 535.
171. According to one commentator, Justice Harlan's opinion in Estes has been
interpreted as: (1) "erecting a per se ban on television coverage of trial proceedings in
accord with the opinions of Clark and Warren;" (2) "limiting the application of the
Court's prohibition to notorious trials;" and (3) "limiting the application of the
Court's prohibition to the facts of the Estes case." Frank, supra note 165, at 758
(footnotes omitted). The third view, which has "emerged as the Supreme Court's
position," id. at 758 n.48 (citations omitted), is supported by language from Justice
Harlan's statement: "At the present juncture I can only conclude that televised trials,
at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even
course of the judicial process that they are constitutionally banned." Estes, 381 U.S.
at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
172. In describing the atmosphere created by coverage of the pre-trial hearings,
Justice Clark wrote:
The videotapes of these hearings clearly illustrate that the picture presented
was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which petitioner was entitled . . . . Indeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom
throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the
proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom fioor,
three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the
jury box and the counsel table.
Estes, 381 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted); see also id. at 552-53, 586 app. (Warren,
C.J., concurring) (discussing the conduct of reporters in the courtroom with photographs as an appendix).
173. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
174. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
175. ld. at 582.
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trials. 176 Thus, the Chandler majority limited the holding of Estes to those trials" 'utterly corrupted' by press coverage."177
C.

Prison Access

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Pell v. Procunier 178 and Saxbe v. Washington
Post CO.179 In Pell several prison inmates and journalists
brought suit challenging section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual, which provided that " '[p]ress
and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will
not be permitted.' "180 Focusing initially on the proposition that
" '[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights,' "181 the Court concluded that security considerations were important enough to
justify the imposition of some restrictions regarding face-to-face
interviews with inmates. 182 "So long as reasonable and effective
means of communication remain open and no discrimination in
terms of content is involved . . . 'prison officials must be accorded latitude.' "183 Recognizing that there" 'may be particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion
and questioning,' "184 the Court went on to conclude that written communication between the media and the inmates, and
communication through inmates' families, friends, clergy, and
attorneys affords inmates a "substantially unimpeded channel
176. Id.
177. Id. at 573 n.8 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975». In
particular, the Court concluded that Estes "is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring stilI photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and
under all circumstances." Id. at 573.
178. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
179. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
180. Pel/, 417 U.S. at 819.
181. Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948». "In the First
Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate retains those
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Id.
182. Id. at 827.
183. Id. at 826 (emphasis added) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972».
According to Justice Stewart: "[I]n light of the alternative channels of communication
that are open to prison inmates, we cannot say on the record in this case that this
restriction on one manner [of communication] is unconstitutional." Id. at 827-28 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 823 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972».
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for communication with . . . representatives of the news media."18s Ultimately, the Court in Pell held that "the Constitution does not ... require government to accord the press special
access to information not shared by members of the public
generally." 186
In Saxbe, the Supreme Court also held that the press has no
more right of access to information than does the public generally. In Saxbe, a major metropolitan newspaper challenged the
constitutionality of one of the policies of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. The regulation in question prohibited any personal interviews between reporters and individually designated prison
inmates. 187 In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court
noted that the policy under consideration was similar to the one
in Pel/, 188 and that the "visitation policy does not place the press
in any less advantageous position than the public generally."189
Indeed, the Court noted that the Bureau of Prisons' policy provided journalists more access than that afforded the public generally in that the policy permitted the press to tour the prisons
and to photograph prison facilities, and to conduct brief interviews with inmates encountered during such tours. 190
In another case decided by the Supreme Court, Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 191 two branches of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and a broadcasting
company, KQED, filed a complaint for injunctive relief after
KQED was denied permission to inspect and take photographs
in a portion of a county jail where a prisoner had committed
suicide and where prison conditions were allegedly responsible
for the prisoner's problems. The complaint alleged that the
county sheriff had violated the First Amendment by refusing to
permit media access and by failing to provide any effective
means by which the public could be informed of the conditions
prevailing at the county jail or learn of the prisoners' griev185. Id. at 824-25. However, the Court was quick to note that this was not "an
attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press'
investigation and reporting of those conditions." Id. at 830.
186. Id. at 834 (footnote omitted).
187. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 (1974).
188. Id. at 846.
189. Id. at 849.
190. Id. at 847.
191. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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ances. 192 The plaintiffs asserted that public access was essential
for NAACP members to participate in the public debate regarding jail conditions in the county jail. The plaintiffs further asserted that television coverage of the conditions in the cells and
facilities was the most effective way of informing the public of
prison conditions. 193
After considering the evidence, the district court preliminarily enjoined the county sheriff from denying KQED news personnel and "responsible representatives" of the news media
access to the prison facilities and from preventing such persons
from utilizing photographic and sound equipment. In particular, the district court found that testimony of officials involved
with other prison facilities indicated that a "more flexible press
policy" at the county jail was both "desirable and attainable."194
On interlocutory appeal from the district court's order, the
county sheriff invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Pel/, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion by ordering the county sheriff to give the media greater access to the jail
than he gave to the general public. Albeit in three separate opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's injunction, holding as follows: "Pel!
v. Procunier does not stand for the proposition that the correlative constitutional rights of the public and the news media to
visit a prison must be implemented identically. The access needs
of the news media and the public differ."195
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the question
presented was whether the news media has a constitutional right
of access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons,
to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio,
and television. 196 In a four to three decision, a three-member
plurality reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that
under Pel! and Saxbe, the media has no special right of access
different from that of the general public. 197 According to Chief
192.
193.
194.
195.
(1978).
196.
197.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6-7.
KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3.
Id. at 15-16.
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Justice Burger's plurality opinion: "The public importance of
conditions in penal facilities and the media's role of providing
information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a
right of the public or the media to enter these institutions, with
camera equipment, and take moving and still pictures of inmates
for broadcast purposes."198
However, in a decisive concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
held that "KQED was entitled to injunctive relief of more limited scope."199 Therefore, under the Supreme Court's "narrowest concurrence" rule, it has been asserted that Justice Stewart's
opinion can, arguably, be viewed as binding precedent. 2OO In his
concurrence, Justice Stewart held that the district court's injunction was overbroad because it gave the press access to areas and
sources of information from which persons on the public tours
had been excluded. 201 Although Justice Stewart agreed with
Chief Justice Burger that the injunction issued by the district
court was overbroad, he disagreed with the plurality opinion as
to how the abstract principles set forth in Pell and Saxbe should
be applied to the facts of the case. In particular, whereas Justice
Stewart felt that "the concept of equal access must be accorded
more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical distinc198. Id. at 9. Despite this holding, Chief Justice Burger's opinion recognized the
media's role as the "eyes and ears" of the public. Id. at 8.
199. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
200. Philbin, supra note 57, at 147 & n. 95; see Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 8 n.8,
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) No. C901383RHS:
Given the division of the Court members, Justice Stewart's opinion governs:
it is the "least common denominator" of the Court's decision. It has long
been the rule that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' "
Id. (citing, among other cases, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977»; see
also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1529-30 &
n.33 (2d ed. 1988).
201. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring):
In two respects . . . the District Court's preliminary injunction was overbroad. It ordered the Sheriff to permit reporters into the [prison] facility and
it required him to let them interview randomly encountered inmates. In
both these respects, the injunction gave the press access to areas and sources
of information from which persons on the public tours had been excluded,
and thus enlarged the scope of what the Sheriff and Supervisors had opened
to public view.

392

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

tions between the press and the general public,"202 Chief Justice
Burger's plurality opinion viewed "equal access" as meaning access that is identical in all respects.
In addition, Justice Stewart emphasized the critical role
that the press plays in a democratic society. According to Justice Stewart:
When on assignment, a journalist does not tour a jail simply for his
own edification. He is there to gather information to be passed on
to others, and his mission is protected by the Constitution for very
specific reasons. "Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is
the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised ...." Our
society depends heavily on the press for that enlightenment.
Though not without its lapses, the press "has been a mighty catalyst
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences.
That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American
society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the
special needs of the press in performing it effectively. A person
touring Santa Rita jail can grasp its reality with his own eyes and
ears. But if a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and
sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place, he must use
cameras and sound equipment. In short, terms of access that are
reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if
they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to
the general public what the visitors see. 203

Subsequently, noting that he "would not foreclose the possibility
of further relief for KQED on remand,"204 Justice Stewart stated
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments required the county
sheriff "to give members of the press effective access to the same
areas" that the general public could already visit.205 In practical
terms, Justice Stewart approved of the district court's finding
that "the media required cameras and recording equipment for
effective presentation to the viewing public of the conditions at
202. [d. at 16.
203. [d. at 17 (citations omitted). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion is consistent with his belief that the press serves as a "Fourth Estate," whose function is to
criticize and question the three official branches of government. See Potter Stewart,
Or a/the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975).
204. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18.
205. [d. at 17 (emphasis in original).
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the jail seen by individual visitors, and that their use could be
kept consistent with institutional needs."206 Indeed, Justice
Stewart stated that this element of the district court's order was
"both sanctioned by the Constitution and amply supported by
the record."207 On remand, the district court implemented Justice Stewart's proposal; KQED was allowed to use "cameras and
recording equipment for effective presentation to the viewing
public . . . ."208
VI.

THE USE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

While the debate between originalists and nonoriginalists
continues,209 the United States Supreme Court undeniably
adopts an historical approach in resolving many constitutional
issues. Therefore, having already examined the history of public
executions,210 this Article will examine how the modem Court
has used an historical framework in previous cases to resolve
other constitutional issues. Arguing by analogy, this Article ultimately concludes that an historical approach, when coupled
with First and Eighth Amendment principles, mandates that
private execution laws must be declared unconstitutional.
A.

Death Penalty Cases

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly used an
historical framework to analyze death penalty issues. In
Furman v. Georgia 211 and in Gregg v. Georgia,212 for example,
members of the Supreme Court reviewed the history of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishments. 213 Noting that the phrase first appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689,214 the Court emphasized that "capital
206. Id. at 18.
207. Id.
208. Philbin, supra note 57, at 148 (citing Plaintiffs Trial Brief at 9, 10 n.9,
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 MEDIA L. REp. (BNA) 2323 (N.D.!Cal. 1991) (No. C901383RHS».
209. Compare Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723
(1991) with Boris 1. Bittker, Observations on Raoul Berger's "Original Intent and Boris
Bittker," 66 IND. L.J. 757 (1991).
210. See supra Section II.
211. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
212. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
213. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 316-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
214. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
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punishment was accepted by the Framers. "21S As the Court
stressed in Gregg: "At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every
state. "216
An historical approach has also been utilized in tangential
areas of death penalty litigation. For instance, in Stanford v.
Kentucky,217 the Court concluded that sentencing sixteen and
seventeen-year-old offenders to death did not violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."218 However, before even reaching this issue, the Court
underscored that "[n]either petitioner asserts that his sentence
constitutes one of 'those modes or acts of punishment that had
been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of
Rights was adopted.' "219

B.

Right of Access Cases

1.

Trials

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia,220 the Anglo-American tradition of open trials was mentioned repeatedly throughout the Justices' opinions. 221 For
215. ld. at 177.
216. ld.
217. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
218. ld. at 364-80.
219. ld. at 368 (quoting Ford V. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986». TheStanford Court noted that, even if the petitioners had asserted such a claim, they could not
have supported their contention. In support of the Court's conclusion, Justice Scalia
stated that, at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, the common law set the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a felony at age 14 and that capital punishment was theoretically possible for anyone over the age of seven. The Court further
emphasized that, in accordance with this common law tradition, at least 281 offenders
under the age of 18 had been executed in the United States. ld. (citations omitted).
220. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
221. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices White and Stevens, contained several references to history. See, e.g., ide at 564 ("The origins of the proceeding which has become the modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be
traced back beyond reliable historical records."); ide at 569 ("[T]he historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open.").
Several of the concurring opinions in Richmond Newspapers also stressed the importance of history in finding a constitutional right of access. See, e.g., ide at 590
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetuated the accepted practice of public trials."); ide at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]t
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example, in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, the history of open
trials was traced back to "the days before the Norman Conquest,"222 with Burger citing such notables as Bentham,223
Blackstone,224 Pollock22s and Coke. 226 Complimenting this approach, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion described the
Court's return to history as "a welcome change in direction,"227
while Justice Brennan's concurring opinion emphasized the importance of "consult[ing] historical and current practice with respect to open trials. "228
Despite the overwhelming Anglo-American tradition of
public trials, in Richmond Newspapers, the State of Virginia argued that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contains
any specific provision protecting the public's right to attend
criminal trialS. 229 Announcing the Court's judgment, Chief Justice Burger responded to this contention: "Standing alone, this
is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent an explicit provision, the Constitution affords protection against exclusion of the public from criminal trialS."230 Concluding that
"the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment,"231 Chief Justice Burger noted that "the
Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are
implicit in enumerated guarantees."232
2.

Cameras in the Courtroom
Because cameras were introduced in the courtroom only re-

has for centuries been a basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system that
trials shall be public trials."); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is gratifying
... to see the Court now looking to and relying upon legal history in detennining the
fundamental public character of the criminal trial.") (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 565.
223. Id. at 569.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 565-66.
226. Id. at 565.
227. Id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 575.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted).
232. Id. at 579. Burger listed as such "unarticulated rights" the rights of association and privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, and the right to travel. Id.
at 579-80.
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cently,233 the Supreme Court has had little opportunity to draw
upon history in handing down its constitutional decisions in this
area. However, the Court has not been completely silent on this
matter. For example, in Estes v. Texas,234 the Court noted the
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials. 235 Starting
with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a "public trial," the Court stated that "[b]istory had
proven that secret tribunals were effective instruments of
oppression. "236
Furthermore, since Estes, the Supreme Court has grown
more tolerant of television's use in judicial proceedings. Most
notably, the Court backed away from Estes' rigid approach in
Chandler v. Florida,237 with at least two Justices in Chandler
suggesting that Estes be overruled. 238 Indeed, in tracking the
technological advances in television since Estes, the Chandler
majority emphasized that "many of the negative factors found in
Estes--cumbersome equipment, cables, distracting lighting, numerous technicians-are less substantial factors today than they
were at that time. "239
3.

Prisons

The cases of Pell v. Procunier 2 and Saxbe v. Washington
Post CO.241 contain little mention of history. In Pen although
the legal issues were fiercely debated, none of the three opinions
4f)

233. According to one commentator, the first televised trial took place in
Oklahoma City in 1953. Frank, supra note 165, at 756 & n.33.
234. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
235. Id. at 539 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948».
236. Id. at 538-39.
237. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
238. [d. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[R]ather than join what seems to me a
wholly unsuccessful effort to distinguish [Estes], I would now flatly overrule it."); id.
at 586-87 (White, J., concurring) ("For the reasons stated by Justice Stewart in his
concurrence today, I think Estes is fairly read as establishing a per se constitutional
rule against televising any criminal trial if the defendant objects. So understood, Estes
must be overruled to affirm the judgment below.").
239. [d. at 576. Indeed, in Estes, Justice Harlan foreshadowed the Court's holding
in Chandler. Estes, 381 U.S. at 595 ("[T]he day may come when television will have
become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate
all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial
process. ").
240. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
241. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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in the case mentioned the history of prison visitation rights.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart was content in stating
that it is a "familiar proposition" that incarceration compels
" 'the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.' "242 In Saxbe, visitation rights again received no
attention, with Justice Powell merely noting in dissent that
"[t]he history of our prisons is in large measure a chronicle of
public indifference and neglect. "243
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court distinguished the Pell and Saxbe cases
on the grounds that those cases "were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not 'open' or public
places."244 According to the Court, "Penal institutions do not
share the long tradition of openness, although traditionally there
have been visiting committees of citizens, and there is no doubt
that legislative committees could exercise plenary oversight and
'visitation rights.' "245
VII.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TELEVISED EXECUTIONS

As noted by judges and commentators, private execution
statutes raise several constitutional issues. First, current statutory schemes raise First Amendment concerns, including the application of right of access, content regulation and prior restraint
jurisprudence. Second, from a radio or television reporter's perspective, because some private execution statutes arguably favor
print journalists over broadcast journalists, such statutes can implicate Equal Protection concerns. Finally, from an inmate's
perspective, right of privacy issues also could arise if a state authorized a televised execution.
Highlighting each of these constitutional concerns, this Article will discuss the constitutionality of the private execution
statutes currently in effect. Although this Article concludes that
242. Pell, 417 U.s. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
243. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 861 n.7 (powell, J., dissenting).
244. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 550, 576 n.ll (1980).
245. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he early penal reform movements in this country and England gained impetus as a result of reports from citizens
and visiting committees who volunteered or received commissions to visit penal institutions and make reports." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 12-13 (1978).
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private execution statutes are unconstitutional, this Article finds
that it is the history of public executions - coupled with the
application of First Amendment principles and the jurisprudence of Trop v. Dulles 246 - that requires the Supreme Court to
invalidate private execution statutes.
A.

First Amendment Analysis

1.

Prior Restraint

The prior restraint doctrine probably originated as an attempt to prohibit the practice of sixteenth and seventeenth century English licensing systems under which all printers were
required to gain the approval of state or church officials before
publishing books or pamphlets. 247 The doctrine was first invoked by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota, 248 in which a
state scheme for abating scandalous or defamatory newspapers
was held unconstitutional. 249 In general, the prior restraint doctrine concerns governmental actions prohibiting the publication
of previously obtained information. 250 The Supreme Court's
preference for subsequent sanctions was best articulated by Chief
Justice Burger in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart:25 1 "A
prior restraint ... has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If
it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
pUblication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for
the time. "252
On the issue of public executions, the Fifth Circuit Court of
246. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
247. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK D. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1131 (2d ed. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 200, § 12-34. See generally Thomas I.
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 648
(1955); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions
of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 245,247-49 (1982).
248. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
249. Id. For a discussion of Near, see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior
Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15-19 (1981).
250. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (the first amendment provides "special protection against orders that prohibit the publication or
broadcast of particular information or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous'
or 'prior' restraint").
251. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
252. [d. at 559.
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Appeals in Ga"ett v. Estelle 253 rejected a prior restraint argument in one terse paragraph:
[A]micus suggests that the proposed simultaneous closed circuit telecast is a "publication" and that to prohibit its use in any way, such
as by filming, is an illegal prior restraint on republication. This suggestion is similar to the argument made by Garrett that once he is
given access to information by the government, here by closed circuit telecast, the government may not limit the use Garrett may
make of the information, such as filming it. But the access granted
to Garrett and the other members of the press is limited. Access for
the purpose of filming is not provided, and the first amendment does
not require that it be provided.254

However, at least one commentator has argued that the
prior restraint doctrine is applicable in the context of public
executions:
[T]o say that prior restraint is eschewed only with respect to publication of news, but not to news gathering, is to ignore that the latter
in most cases precedes the former, and that in cases like Ga"ett
both are content-related. It takes little imagination to understand
that, as long as the objective is to suppress publication because of its
content, there is little difference between situations in which the
government first allows the cameraman to film the event and then
takes his film away, and those in which the government merely prevents him from filming altogether; the result is the same and only
the means have been changed.255

Despite this poignant attempt to apply the prior restraint
doctrine to restrictions on the filming of executions, this argument stretches the doctrine too far. Although the prior restraint
doctrine has been used to eliminate numerous types of government censorship,256 the doctrine has never embraced newsgathering.257 In Pell v. Procunier, 258 for example, the Supreme
253. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).

254. Id. at 1279.
255. Comment, supra note 80, at 749 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
256. The prior restraint doctrine has been applied "to void procedurally inadequate schemes of government censorship of films, books, and plays; to strike down
overbroad permit requirements; and to invalidate discriminatory taxes on the press."
TruBE, supra note 200, § 12-34, at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted).
257. See Emerson, supra note 247, at 655-56 (listing four types of prior restraints,
none of which includes newsgathering activities); see also Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions

on Press Coverage ofMilitary Operations: The Right ofAccess, Grenada, and "Off-theRecord Wars," 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 949 (1985) ("Prior restraint analysis is not particularly helpful ... in considering whether the Constitution requires press access to military operations."). As Cassell argues in the context of military operations, "[d]enying
the press access to military operations . . . does not forbid the publication of any
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Court stated:
It is one thing to say ... that government cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from [certain] sources. . . . It is quite
another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of
information not available to members of the public generally.259

Likewise, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,260 the Supreme Court
held that where a pretrial exclusion order did not prevent the
press "from publishing any information in its possession," the
proper inquiry was whether the press has been denied any constitutional right of access. 261 Thus, because the prior restraint
doctrine only prohibits the government from suppressing information already in the hands of journalists and private parties,
the prior restraint doctrine is not an effective tool with which to
attack private execution statutes.
2.

Content Regulation

With its roots in the 1930s and 194Os, the "content distinction" in First Amendment jurisprudence has emerged as a fixture in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws
regulating speech.262 "Content-based" restrictions limit expression based on the message they convey. Examples of such restrictions are laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the
publication of confidential information, or outlaw the display of
swastikas in certain neighborhoods. "Content-neutral" restrictions limit communication without regard to the content or
communicative impact of the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit noisy speeches near hospitals, ban billboards in residential
communities, or forbid the distribution of pamphlets in public
infonnation; rather it prevents the press and the public from obtaining infonnation."
Id. at 950 (footnote omitted).
258. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
259. Id. at 834.
260. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
261. Id. at 393 n.25.
262. See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 189, 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 46 (1987) [hereinafter
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination. 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982); Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1904 (1989).
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places are illustrations of content-neutral regulations. 263 While
content-based restrictions receive strict scrutiny,264 content-neutral regulations are reviewed under several varied standards.265
Because private execution statutes focus on preventing the
subsequent broadcast of an execution, it has been argued that
such restrictions impermissibly regulate content. 266 Not only is
this view in accord with libertarian principles of the First
Amendment, it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as
well. 267 For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,268 the United States Supreme Court held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of
content presumptively violate the First Amendment. 269 According to the Mosley Court:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. . .. To permit the continued building
of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive
activity because of its content would completely undercut the
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'>270

Indeed, members of the Supreme Court have also recognized the
importance of television in conveying news to the general public.
263. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 262, at 47-48; Stone, Content
Regulation, supra note 262, at 189-90.
264. Content-based restrictions are subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,412 (1989) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485' U.S. 312, 321 (1988».
To withstand such scrutiny, such restrictions will only be upheld if they are the least
restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
265. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 262, at 48. As recently as
1987, Geoffrey Stone identified seven such standards of review, ranging from a highly
deferential standard to a strict level of scrutiny. See id. at 48-54 (discussing the seven
standards).
266. Comment, supra note 80, at 747-48.
267. See id.
268. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
269. Id. at 95, 98-99; see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41,46-47 (1986); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980). Restrictions on
the content of first amendment expression may be justified only if a substantial governmental interest is found to exist. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92.
270. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (citations omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964».
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As Justice Powell noted in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 271 the public is the "loser" when news coverage is
limited to "watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture."272 According to Justice Powell, "This is
hardly the kind of news reportage that the First Amendment is
meant to foster."273
In Garrett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit only briefly discussed content regulation. According to
the court:
In order to sustain Garrett's argument we would have to find that
the moving picture of the actual execution possessed some quality
giving it "content" beyond, for example, that possessed by a simulation of the execution. We discern no such quality from the record
or from our inferences therein. Despite the unavailability of film of
the actual execution the public can be fully informed; the free flow
of ideas and information need not be inhibited. 274

However, in addressing content regulation so hastily, the
Garrett court overlooked several important points. First, there
271. 433 u.s. 562 (1977).
272. ld. at 581 (powell, J., dissenting).
273. ld.; see also Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (noting the unique
features of television in reversing a criminal conviction because of a televised confession); Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245
(N.D. Ga. 1981):
Many citizens likely rely on television as their sole source of news. Further,
visual impressions can and sometimes do add a material dimension to one's
impression of particular news events. Television film coverage of the news
provides a comprehensive visual element and an immediacy, or simultaneous
aspect, not found in print media . . .. [T]he importance of conveying the
fullest information possible increases as the importance of the particular
news event or news setting increases.
Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D.
Utah 1985) (citation omitted) (holding that there is a first amendment right of access
to traditionally open administrative hearings and finding that furnishing a transcript is
no substitute for television coverage):
The press and public are denied access to unfiltered information while it is
still fresh. A stale transcript is not an adequate substitute for access to the
hearings themselves. Emotions, gestures, facial expressions, and pregnant
pauses do not appear on the reported transcript. Much of what makes good
news is lost in the difference between a one-dimensional transcript and an
opportunity to see and hear testimony as it unfolds.
People v. Thompson, 50 Ca1.3d 134, 182, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) (noting
that some events in the criminal process are "simply indescribable in mere words" and
require photographic presentation); cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 573, 577
n.l2 (1980) (noting that people acquire information about the criminal process
"chiefly through the print and electronic media").
274. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977).
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is a qualitative difference between watching an actual execution
and a simulated execution. Watching a simulation of President
Kennedy's assassination, for example, would not evoke the same
emotions for many as watching the actual film footage. Because
private execution laws, by definition, affect the "communicative
impact" of the message journalists are able to convey, such content-based regulations must be struck down as unconstitutional. 275 In fact, with television stations in the United States
already broadcasting assassinations and executions in other
countries, including executions in Iraq, Romania, Saudi Arabia
and Vietnam,276 it is ironic and contrary to First Amendment
principles that executions performed by our own government are
deemed inappropriate for television audiences in the United
States. Second, in addressing the issue of content regulation, the
Garrett court ignored the fact that producing simulations is expensive and time-consuming. Indeed, if television stations are
forced to produce their own execution simulations, political
speech may be chilled. In this regard, the case of Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 277 is
instructive. There, a state use tax assessed a tax on the costs of
275. Televised executions would provide more reliable and accurate information
about such events than eyewitness accounts. For example, the newspaper accounts of
one execution indicates that the reporters had widely different versions of whether the
condemned prisoner had to be wrestled into the execution chamber and what exactly
the condemned prisoner said. While one report had the prisoner insanely shouting "I
am Jesus Christ," another report had the prisoner resignedly muttering "Oh, my Jesus
Christ." Other recollections also differed with the newspaper accounts. See Plaintiff's
Post-Trial Brief at 22-23 & n.18, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS); see also Angeja, supra note 124, at 1500
("A television image can convey exactly what a spectator would see if she were present within the execution chamber."); Richards & Easter, supra note 57, at 403 (footnote omitted) ("no simulation can provide precisely the same content (e.g.,
expressions on the face of the condemned) as the actual event"); MARSHALL
McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) ("the medium is the message"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647
(1985) ("The use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's
message, and it may also serve to impart information directly. Accordingly, commercial illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial speech ....").
276. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 24, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS). Television broadcasts of assassinations
have included, among others, John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther
King, Jr., and Lee Harvey Oswald. [d.
277. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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the ink and paper used in producing publications. 278 However,
because a provision exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and
paper, the law as applied affected only a handful of the state's
largest newspapers.279 While the Supreme Court found no evidence that the state legislature was attempting to impermissibly
regulate the content of the papers,280 the Court subjected the law
to strict scrutiny and held that the provision was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 281 The Court stated, "A tax
that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications
within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its
action. "282 Thus, if television stations are required to produce
their own execution simulations in order to attempt to communicate their message, private execution statutes are unconstitutional as applied to television stations. 283
The asserted justifications for private execution statutes
clearly indicate that such regulations are "content-based." For
instance, prison officials often express concerns about the impact
of televised executions on inmates and other television viewers,
including the fear that pictures of an execution will reveal the
identity of witnesses or prison officials. Because these alleged
concerns relate in toto to the communicative impact of televised
broadcasts, private execution laws are obviously concerned with
the regulation of the content of speech. 284
278. [d. at 578.
279. [d. at 578-79.
280. See id. at 592.
281. See id. at 591. According to the Court: "Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out
the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press
presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify
the scheme." [d. at 591-92.
282. [d. at 592-93.
283. Accord Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (a
sales tax that exempted certain classes of magazines was held unconstitutional); Board
of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (recognizing a student's right of access
to certain books in a high school library where the school board didn't ban the use of
such books, but forced students to take the more expensive and less convenient route
of acquiring the books from sources other than the school library); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (a license tax upon advertising receipts based on a
newspaper's circulation was held unconstitutional because it attempted to limit the
dissemination of information by placing a tax upon a select group of newspapers).
284. See Angeja, supra note 124, at 1506 (footnote omitted) ("Since cameras are
allowed into prisons to televise other events, only the content oftelevised broadcasts of
executions differentiates regulations concerning this particular use of the camera.").
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Because states can assert only "sham" interests to justify
private execution statutes/8S such statutes must be declared unconstitutional. On the issue of prison security, for example,
states have asserted that prison riots may occur or that prison
staff or their families may be attacked or harassed by inmates or
others who view an execution film. However, the presence of a
camera in the execution chamber will not jeopardize prison security.286 First, given that prisoners can be confined to their
cells during an execution, the possibility that prison riots will
occur during executions is pure speculation. 287 Second, fears
that prison employees may be attacked or threatened assumes
that an execution film will record the faces of prison personnel.
However, as the plaintiffs suggested in KQED, less restrictive alternatives to address this concern include, inter alia, the use of
"electronic masking" or screening prior to an execution film being broadcast or instructing a camera operator not to tum the
camera on until the condemned person has been strapped into
the gas chamber chair and the officers are out of sight. 2BB "Additionally, since television sets are conditionally provided to the
285. States may not offer "sham" justifications for a restriction on free speech.
Thus, it has been held that a regulation affecting free speech rights is unconstitutional
if "it does not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justification." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 (1983); see also Greer v. Spack, 424
U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (powell, J., concurring) ("any significant restriction of First
Amendment freedoms carries a heavy burden of justification"); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981) (the burden of
justifying a regulation affecting first amendment freedoms is on the government).
286. "[I]t is unclear how viewing the inside of the private execution chamber jeopardizes prison security and safety-particularly if members of the press and public
already have been granted physical access to the chamber." Tao, supra note 80, at
1076 (footnote omitted).
287. First amendment restrictions can withstand constitutional scrutiny only
where the danger is "likely" and "imminent." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
288. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 19-21, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS); see also Richards & Easter, supra
note 57, at 411-12 (noting other alternatives that would be more "narrowly tailored"
to serve the interests of prison security). In the challenge to California's private execution statute, there was substantial evidence that the real reasons for excluding television cameras from the execution chamber had nothing to do with prison security. See
Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 23-24, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. 2323
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS) (witnesses gave the following reasons for not
allowing public executions: "dignity," "don't want this turned into a circus,"
"thought it was not an appropriate item for public viewing," and "wouldn't be in good
taste").
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inmate population, restrictions could easily be levied on their
use."289 A state's allegation, such as in the KQED case, that a
camera may be thrown at the execution chamber glass is clearly
a sham, as a camera easily could be bolted to the floor.290 Likewise, regardless of whether protecting children from watching
an execution is a legitimate governmental concern,291 restricting
the broadcast time of an execution is a less restrictive alternative
than banning the broadcast altogether. 292
That the real purpose of private execution laws is to prevent
the general public from hearing about the details of executions is
reinforced by several state statutes, which provide that executions only be conducted during the middle of the night or that
the details of executions not be published at all. For example, in
Louisiana, every execution is to take place between the hours of
midnight and 3:00 a.m.293 Likewise, in South Dakota, where executions can only take place between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and
6:00 a.m.,294 the statute makes it a misdemeanor for persons in289. Philbin, supra note 57, at 154 (footnote omitted). According to KQED's trial
brief: "The fact that the defendant chooses to allow prisoners to have television sets,
and apparently is unwilling to disconnect them when he thinks a particular program
may be problematical, cannot justify blacking out the entire general public." This
position, KQED asserted, would allow the "prisoner tail . . . [to] wag the First
Amendment dog." Plaintifrs Post-Trial Reply Brief at 8, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18
Media L. Rep. (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS).
290. See Plaintifrs Post-Trial Brief at 23, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L.
Rep. 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS).
291. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents'
claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968). However, it is well-settled
that "the government may not 'reduce the adult population ... to ... only what is fit
for children.''' Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Commission, 492
U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983)).
292. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535
(1980) (a restriction which regulates "the time, place, or manner" of speech may be
imposed so long as it is reasonable and so long as the restriction serves "a significant
governmental interest" and leaves "ample alternative channels for communication");
cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 & n.28 (1978) (emphasizing the "narrowness of [its] holding" and refusing to reach the issue of whether a broadcast late in
the evening could be constitutionally prohibited, five members of the Supreme Court
held that an FCC order that prohibited an early afternoon radio broadcast of a 12minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words" did not violate the first amendment).
293. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:569.1 (West 1992).
294. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-17 (1988).
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vited to attend the execution to disclose the exact time of the
execution. 29s Indeed, in Arkansas, it is unlawful for an individual to merely print or publish details of an execution. 296 Undoubtedly, such laws, on their face, impermissibly regulate the
content of speech.297
Although the Supreme Court has expressed an unwillingness to strike down statutes on the basis of illicit legislative motives,298 it is well-established that "regulations enacted for the
purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment."299 Because private
execution laws remain in place for the paternalistic reasons for
which they were originally enacted, such regulations presumptively violate the First Amendment. In this regard, it is significant that the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to
invalidate "sham" laws enacted for an "avowed" constitutional
purpose. 300
However, regardless of whether private execution statutes
295. ld. at § 23A-27A-37 (1988).
296. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
297. It is well-established that "the First Amendment forbids the government from
regulating speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others." City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). Indeed, a
regulation is considered content-based if it seeks to eliminate debate on an entire issue,
even if the regulation does not" 'favor either side of a controversy.''' Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (plurality) (quoting Consolidated Edison, Co. v. Public Servo
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980».
298. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (citing
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968». But see Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (citation omitted) ("The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech cases generally, and in time, place, or manner in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration.").
299. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 46263 & n.7 (1980) and Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99
(1972».
300. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring the
posting of copies of the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the establishment clause of the first amendment despite the fact that the statute's "avowed" purpose was "secular and not religious"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87
(1987) ("While the Court is normally deferential to a state's articulation of a secular
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a
sham."); cJ. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large election system unconstitutional where trial court evidence supported finding of intentional discrimination);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (emphasis added) ("The
government's purpose is the controlling consideration" in first amendment analysis.)
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are considered "content-based" or "content-neutral,"301 the
Supreme Court should find such laws unconstitutional because
such regulations violate the court's anti-paternalistic understanding of the First Amendment and assume that the government knows best.302 Thus, private execution statutes violate the
Supreme Court's First Amendment understanding that "information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them."303 Furthermore, the enforcement of private execution statutes runs contrary to the
Court's observation in First Nat'/ Bank of Boston v. Bellotti: 304
"[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting
arguments ... [and] if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments . . . it is a danger
contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment. "305 As
the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[A] principal 'function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis301. Philbin, supra note 57, at 153 ("In the cases examined thus far, the states have
successfully argued that [media tool] restrictions were not content-based, but were
instead content-neutral restrictions grounded in security and privacy concerns.").
302. See Stone, Content Regulation. supra note 262, at 212-14.
303. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also Benjamin Lombard, Note, First Amendment Limits on
the Use of Taxes to Subsidize Selectively the Media. 78 CORNELL L. REV. 106, 125
("The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to receive information and
ideas as a necessary corollary to the right to speak.") (emphasis added); Richards &
Easter, supra note 57, at 393 n. 59 (citing cases finding a right to receive information).
The "right to receive" information has been extended to "personal correspondence,
political and religious material, commercial information, pornography, and information and ideas generally." Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The
Right to Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond
Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Even when content-neutral regulations are subjected to "rational basis" review, such regulations must
leave open alternative methods of disseminating the relevant information. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556-67 & n.12 (1972).
304. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
305. Id. at 791-92; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971) ("The constitutional right of free expression is ... intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.").
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pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.' "306 Thus, "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."307
3.

Right of Access

In the landmark decision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Virginia. 308 the Supreme Court recognized the
public's First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. In that
case, Chief Justice Burger observed that it is not crucial whether
the right to attend criminal trials is described as a "right of access" or a "right to gather information."309 For, as Burger noted
in his plurality opinion, the Court has "recognized that 'without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.' "310 Moreover, the rights "to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much
meaning if access to observe the trial could . . . be foreclosed
arbitrarily. "311
Since Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a broader right of access to gather information. In
1982, for example, the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court 312 considered a challenge to a statute allowing automatic
trial closure for sexual offense cases involving minor victims. 313
Recognizing that the right to attend criminal trials is not abso306. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949». Notably, in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988),
where a law prohibiting the display of picketing signs within a certain distance of
foreign embassies was struck down, the Supreme Court reiterated its " 'long-standing
refusal' " to punish speech because the particular speech may have" 'an adverse emotional impact on the audience.'" ld. at 322 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988». For a detailed discussion of the "secondary effects"
doctrine in the context of televised executions, see Tao, supra note 80, at 1073-75.
Also, for a discussion of "conduct," as opposed to "speech," in the context ofte1evised
executions, see id. at lO72-73.
307. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
308. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
309. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.
310. ld. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972».
311. ld. at 576-77 (footnote omitted).
312. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
313. ld. at 598 n.l.
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lute, the Court discussed the right of access in terms of its historical roots and its vital role in the judicial process. 314 Ultimately,
the Court concluded that where a state "attempts to deny the
right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."31s While the Court agreed that the state has
a compelling interest in safeguarding victims from additional
trauma, the Court held that the mandatory closure rule was too
restrictive and thus violative of the First Amendment. 316
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,317 the Supreme
Court also broadened the right to gather information. In that
case, the Court held that the guarantees of open public proceedings cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential
jurors. Citing the importance of history utilized in Richmond
Newspapers, the Court in Press-Enterprise also used historical evidence in concluding that juries have traditionally been selected
in public. 31s Indeed, the Court concluded that the presumption
of openness could only be overcome by a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 319
Lower courts have also extended the rationale of Richmond
Newspapers into other areas. For example, in Westmoreland v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 320 and Publicker Industries,
Inc. v. Cohen, 321 the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sec314. [d. at 605-06.
315. [d. at 606-07.
316. [d. at 607-11. Emphasizing that cases must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis, the Court spoke in the following terms:
In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from the courtroom
of the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-olfense
victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations
in individual cases, is unconstitutional.
[d. at 611 n.27.
317. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
318. The Press-Enterprise Court traced the jury selection process back to the Norman Conquest and noted that "[p]ublic jury selection ... was the common practice in
America when the Constitution was adopted." [d. at 505-08.
319. [d. at 510; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)
(holding that the public has a right of access to preliminary hearings).
320. 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985).
321. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have
also held that a right of access exists to civil proceedings. See generally Westmoreland
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017
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ond and Third Circuits held that there is a constitutional right of
access to attend civil trials. In short, civil proceedings have been
held to implicate the same First Amendment rights as criminal
trialS. 322 Once again, the presumption of openness can only be
overcome by an overriding governmental interest and a lack of
viable alternatives.
Because executions have historically been open to the general public, the public has a constitutional right of access to attend executions. Not only does allowing such access "protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs,"323 but it also ensures
that individual citizens can effectively participate and contribute
to the American system of self-government. 324 Indeed, as the
Court articulated in Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 325 "To work effectively, it is important that
society'S criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of justice,' and
the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it."326 As the Court continued, "People in an
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing."327
Furthermore, a constitutional right of access to attend executions should not be inhibited merely because such events
(1985); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FrC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
322. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1067-71. As the Third Circuit stated:
From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that the public and the press
possess a First Amendment and a common law right of access to civil proceedings; indeed, there is a presumption that these proceedings will be open.
The trial court may limit this right, however, when an important countervailing interest is shown.
lei. at 1071.
323. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Protecting the free discussion of
governmental affairs was cited by the Globe Newspaper Court as being an underlying
purpose of the first amendment right of access to criminal trials. Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
324. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.s. 88, 95 (1940).
325. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
326. lei. at 571-72 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (citation
omitted».
327. lei. at 572. Information about the criminal justice system is "of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper
conduct of public business." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.s. 469, 495
(1975).
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were privatized over the course of the last 150 years. Considering the centuries' old practice of public executions in Europe and
the well-established tradition of public executions in the United
States before the 1830s and unti11937,328 this amount of time is
de minimis. Indeed, especially considering the fact that television and radio are modern technologies, it would be illogical to
punish modern day litigants on the ground that previous generations failed to challenge private execution statutes until the
1970s in Garrett v. Estelle. 329 In short, states should not be dealt
a "constitutional waiver" trump card just because the well-established practice of public executions was changed in the United
States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 330
However, all of this is not to suggest that executions must
now be conducted in Central Park or downtown Dallas. Given
modern day technology, broadcast journalists - acting as surrogates for the people - can easily film executions and transmit
the footage to American households via videotape or television.
Thus, whereas physical space limitations might have posed
problems in the past, the advent of television and video technology allows government officials to continue conducting executions in prisons while allowing the general public to "witness"
the event. However, "[i]n such situations, representatives of the
press must be assured access."331 Televising executions will allow the general public to debate, in a real way, the morality of
capital punishment. 332
328. See supra Section II.
329. 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
330. See supra Section II. Notably, one commentator has argued that "history
does not demonstrate an unbroken tradition of press and public access to executions"
and that this conclusion "precludes a finding that executions 'historically harvel been
open to the press and general public.''' Dave A. Drobny, Note, Death TV: Media
Access to Executions Under the First Amendment, 70 WASH U. L.Q. 1179, 1201-02
(1992) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982». However, what this commentator fails to recognize is that even modern-day private execution statutes generally allow for the attendance of some members of the public. See
supra notes 66-72 (citing several statutes that mandate the attendance of a certain
number of "reputable" citizens). Thus, the general public has never been truly barred
from execution proceedings.
331. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600 n.3.
332. Cj. Times Publishing Co. v. Florida, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1861, 1863 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (Florida Department of Corrections emergency rule canceling all
regularly scheduled interviews with condemned prisoners until death warrant "is executed, expires, or is stayed," is invalid as applied to particular prisoner whose death
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Equal Protection Analysis

In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley333 the Supreme
Court held that the Equal Protection clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to
their legitimate objectives. 334 In practice, however, the Supreme
Court has both embraced33s and eschewed336 reliance on the
Equal Protection clause when deciding First Amendment issues.
This has led one scholar to remark that "[i]nvocation of the
equal protection clause" may only "deflect attention" from the
central First Amendment issue. 337 Thus, although courts have
held that governmental entities cannot deny access to some
members of the press while granting access to others,338 such
Equal Protection cases may only distract from the more fundamental "content regulation" issue that private execution statutes
raise.
warrant is outstanding, because interviews with condemned prisoners whose deaths
are imminent are "uniquely of interest to a public which continues to debate the morality of capital punishment").
An individual's "right to know" originates with "the widely accepted principle
that the core value protected by the first amendment is the citizen's right to participate
in America's representative democracy." Hayes., supra note 303, at 1113; see also
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
REsEARCH J. 521, 593 (freedom of expression acts as a watchdog of the government).
The framers of the Constitution explicitly recognized the important role that access to
information plays in a representative democracy. See Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (T. Jefferson) in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 220-21
(paul L. Ford ed., 1893) ("[W]hereas ... experience hath shewn, that even under the
best forms, those entrusted with power have, in time ... perverted it into tyranny; and
it is belieVed that the most effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate,
as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large. . . ."); Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular government, without popular information or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.").
333. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
334. ld. at 101.
335. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
336. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
337. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 262, at 206.
338. See, e.g., Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8,
15 (S.D. Iowa 1971) ("Defendants' denial of access by Quad-City to records available
to the other media presents an obvious case of denial of equal protection of the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.").
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In comparing the areas of content regulation and Equal
Protection, it has been argued that the notion of equality "lies at
the heart of the First Amendment's protections against governmental regulation of the content of speech."339 Indeed, according to the Dean of the University of Chicago Law School,
Geoffrey Stone, there is an obvious connection between the concept of equality and the "content-based"/"content-neutral" distinction. For, when government restricts only certain ideas or
items of information, people wishing to articulate the restricted
viewpoint or information receive "unequal" treatment. 34O However, as Stone points out, there are dangers in emphasizing
equality. "By focusing on equality," Stone writes, "the Court
may invite government to 'equalize,' not by permitting more
speech, but by adopting even more 'suppressive' content-neutral
restrictions. "341 Obviously, the attempt by California officials in
KQED to prohibit all journalists from witnessing the execution
of Robert Alton Harris illustrates the danger of Equal Protection challenges to private execution statutes. 342

C.

Right of Privacy Analysis

In his 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 343 Justice
Louis Brandeis defined the constitutional right of privacy as "the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. "344 As Laurence Tribe
339. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 21 (1975). According to Karst, "[j]ust as the prohibition of
government-imposed discrimination on the basis of race is central to equal protection
analysis, protection against governmental discrimination on the basis of speech content is central among first amendment values." Id. at 35.
340. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 262, at 202.
341. Id. at 205; see also Roy A. Black, Case Comment, Equal But Inadequate Pr0tection: A Look at Mosley and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469 (1973) (criticizing the reliance on equal protection analysis in first amendment cases).
342. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. But cJ. Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (a West Virginia statute prohibiting newspapers
from publishing the name of a juvenile offender was unconstitutional because it applied to newspapers alone); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (emphasis
added) ("When a state attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this
interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as
well as the media giant.").
343. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
344. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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points out, that formulation reveals the paradox of the right of
privacy: "[I]t is revered by those who live within civil society as
a means of repudiating the claims that civil society would make
of them."345 Human beings are social creatures, yet "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "346 Speaking
for a unanimous Court in Whalen v. Roe,347 Justice Stevens
stated that this paradoxical right includes an "individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and an "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions. "348
According to the Supreme Court, although it is a "familiar
proposition" that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined,349 it is also true that prisoners do not lose all civil
liberties. 350 As Chief Justice Burger noted in his plurality opinion in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. :351 "Inmates in jails, prisons, or
mental institutions retain certain fundamental rights of privacy;
they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed
at will by the public or by media reporters, however 'educational' the process may be for others."3s2
Because prisoners retain a constitutional right of privacy, in
deciding whether executions may be televised over an inmate's
objection, this right of privacy must be balanced against ·other
competing "rights." For, while granting the condemned's last
request may seem reasonable, a sound jurisprudence recognizes
that the law "mediates most significantly between right and
right."3s3 In the execution setting, the competing "rights,"
345. TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1302.
346. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747,777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIRS 288, 288-89 (1977»; see also TRIBE, supra note 200, § 15-1, at 1302.
347. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
348. Id. at 599-600.
349. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
350. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (listing several
prisoner rights); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) ("We have repeatedly
held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. No 'iron curtain'
separates one from the other.").
351. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
352. Id. at 5 n.2.
353. Paul A. Freund, Legal Frameworks for Human Experimentation, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 105, 105 (paul A. Freund ed., 1970).
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along with the condemned's privacy interest, include the public's
interest in witnessing executions and the state's interest in
deterrence.
In balancing these interests, courts should consider several
factors. First, the public's interest in witnessing executions
should be accorded significant weight. For, not only will televised executions further the goal of an informed self-government, but such events can create societal consensus on capital
punishment issues. 354 Second, because deterrence is a legitimate
legislative rationale for the death penalty,355 a state's desire to
televise executions should receive attention because televised executions might arguably deter capital crimes. 356 Finally, against
the interests of the public and the states, courts should consider
an inmate's wishes. On this point, the approach of Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,357 the "right-to-die" case, seems particularly apt: "Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of
an ignoble end . . . is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death . . . is a
matter of extreme consequence. "358
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's eloquent language in
Cruzan, the Supreme Court is unlikely to allow a condemned
inmate's privacy interests to outweigh those of the public or the
states. By way of analogy, consider the case of Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn. 359 In Cox, the identity of a seventeen-year-old
deceased rape victim was obtained through public records and
broadcast on television. The victim's father brought suit against
the reporter and the television station for invasion of privacy,
354. See infra notes 411-13 and accompanying text.
355. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976) ("The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.").
356. See supra, note I.
357. 497 U.S. 271 (1990).
358. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Likewise, as one commentator has noted
in the public execution context: "Sharing his pain and suffering with unrelated observers should not necessarily be part of the penalty the prisoner pays for his crime."
Mamantov, supra note 9, at 401. But cf. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)) (ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not characterize
the right to refuse treatment as a privacy right; rather, he framed the issue as one more
properly analyzed in terms of a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest.")
359. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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grounded upon a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to
broadcast the name of a rape victim.360 In ruling that Georgia
was barred from making the defendant's telecasts the basis of
civil liability, the Supreme Court favored the press in this
"sphere of collision" between privacy and free press claims. 361
The Court stated, "We are reluctant to embark on a course that
would make public records generally available to the media but
forbid their pUblication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man. "362 Because a statutory prohibition
against the disclosure of a rape victim's name in Cox constituted
an insufficient competing interest vis-a-vis the press, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to preserve the privacy of a notorious
criminal in the face of the public's right to know about his or her
execution. 363
360. ld. at 473-74.
361. ld. at 491.
362. Id. at 496; see also id. at 491 ("[I]n a society in which each individual has but
limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form
the facts of those operations."); id. at 492 ("Without the information provided by the
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently
or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.").
363. Comment, supra note 80, at 739; Angeja, supra note 124, at 1507-10; see also
Comment, supra note 80, at 739 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822)
("Although there appeared to be a substantial public interest in favor of withholding
the rape victim's identity in Cox, there does not appear to be any public interest served
by preserving the privacy of a notorious criminal, especially in light of the 'familiar
proposition' that incarceration limits the retention of many privileges and rights.");
Tao, supra note 80, at 1076 ("Even absent [the prisoner's] consent, it is difficult to
reconcile [the condemned's privacy] interest with statutes such as that in effect in
California, which mandate semi-public executions by requiring the presence in the
execution chamber of witnesses other than prison officials and those selected by the
condemned.").
According to one commentator, condemned prisoners cannot avoid press coverage because they are already the object of such extensive reporting that they have
become "public figures." Comment, supra note 80, at 740 n.131 (citing Gertz v. Rohert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 351 (1974»; see also Van Straten v. Milwaukee
Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. App. 1989), cerro denied, 496
U.S. 929 (1990) (inmate was limited purpose public figure who failed to make required
showing of actual malice in a defamation action against several newspapers); Cox
Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. App.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 982
(1985) (television station was not liable for invasion of prison inmate's privacy by
disclosing fact that he was incarcerated, intrudjng upon his seclusion, portraying him
in a false light or appropriating his likeness in pursuit of pecuniary gain, where inmate
only incidentally appeared in background of broadcast report concerning alleged
abuses by prison officials, in light of legitimate public interest served by broadcast);
Huskey v. Dallas Chronicle, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (D. Or. 1986) (newspa-
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Even if legislatures were given discretion to enact appropriate legislation in the privacy area,364 private executions would
still be unconstitutional where the condemned person consents
to the pUblicity. Indeed, in cases where a condemned person
wants to have the execution filmed, it would be quite perverse to
deny him or her this final request on the ground that it violated
his or her own right of privacy. For this reason, any legislative
scheme providing for a private execution based upon the right of
privacy must be waivable at the condemned inmate's request. 365
VIII.

INTEGRATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH
TROP V. DULLES

The First and Eighth Amendments to the United States
per's publication, in connection with news story concerning plaintiff prisoner's escape
from custOdy, of photograph that was taken inside jail and that depicted plaintiff being
booked does not invade plaintifrs privacy); Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio.
Com. PI. 1986) (news reports by media concerning plaintifrs arrest and indictment
could not, as a matter of law, form the basis for a claim of intrusion upon seclusion
because matters broadcast had nothing to do with plaintifrs secret, secluded, or private concerns, but were matters already within public realm at time of reports);
Holman v. Central Arkansas Broadcasting, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979) (POlice officers, in allowing radio station reporter access to jail block, did not violate attorney's
right to privacy, because no right to privacy is invaded when state officials facilitate
publication of official act such as arrest); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D.
Conn. 1971) (a prison regulation was upheld where it allowed reporters access to a
prison for stories related to prison life and conditions). But see Huskey v. National
Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. III. 1986) (prisoner, who had been filmed
while in "exercise cage," wearing only gym shorts, leaving certain distinct tattoos exposed, who alleged, in his complaint, that he was engaged in "private activities,"
stated claim for invasion of privacy).
364. One commentator has argued that, regardless of whether the Supreme Court
finds a constitutional right of access to executions, "independent policy concerns dictate that state legislatures grant at least a limited right of public and press access to
executions." Mamantov, supra note 9, at 374-75.
365. See Mamantov, supra note 9, at 403. In California's KQED case, the condemned killer, Robert Alton Harris, said he would have "no problem" with television
cameras recording his execution. In a telephone interview with San Diego television
station KGTV, Harris said that a televised execution might change some minds about
capital punishment. "I think that the public is blind to just what type of ordeal a
person goes through when he's executed," he said. "And that may have a bearing on
the public opinion on the death penalty in generaL" Associated Press, Condemned
Killer: "No Problem" with Televised Execution. June 14, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current File. A recent survey of death row inmates in Florida revealed
substantial support for televised executions among the death row population. See
Richards & Easter, supra note 57, at 419 & n.l64 (citing survey results from the Committee on Corrections, Florida House of Representatives, indicating that twenty-one
inmates, out of twenty-nine survey responses, favored televising executions).
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Constitution serve widely divergent purposes. While the First
Amendment protects free speech rights, including the right to
engage in political discourse,366 the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments."367 At
first blush, these two amendments do not appear to compliment
each other in any way. Yet, with respect to the constitutionality
of private execution statutes, this Article argues that Eighth
Amendment principles, first developed in Trop v. Dulles,368 play
a role in First Amendment jurisprudence.
A.

"Evolving Standards of Decency" and "Human Dignity"

According to the Eighth Amendment, "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."369 Although what constitutes a
"cruel and unusual punishment" is difficult to delineate, the
Supreme Court has developed several tests to determine the constitutionality of a particular punishment. In discussing the interaction of the First and Eighth Amendments, two Eighth
Amendment principles are relevant.
First, under Trop v. Dulles, 370 a punishment must not offend
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."371 In determining to what extent society's
standards have "evolved," members of the Supreme Court look
"not to [their] own conceptions of decency, but to those of modem American society as a whole."372 As the Court stated in
Coker v. Georgia,373 "Eighth Amendment judgments should not
be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
366. The complete text of the first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." u.s. CONST.,
amend. I.
367. U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII.
368. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
369. U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962) (the eighth amendment held applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
370. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
371. fd. at 101.
372. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (footnote omitted).
373. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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maximum possible extent."374 Foremost among the" 'objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction' "
are statutes passed by elected representatives. 375 Other objective
indicia used to determine modem conceptions of decency include the history of a particular punishment, jury verdicts, and
international opinion. 376
Second, under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a penalty
must not offend the "dignity of man"-the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment."377 To violate the human dignity principle, the Supreme Court has held that a punishment
must be "excessive."378 A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to the accepted
goals of punishment or is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime. 379
As articulated in Gregg, a penalty "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering" violates the human dignity principle. 380 According to
374. [d. at 592.
375. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976».
376. See generally Lawrence A. Vanor, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment
for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757,
763 (1986) (discussing objective indicia). Notably, some commentators list public
opinion polls as an "objective indicia." See, e.g., William Wilson, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline for
the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 344, 362 (1983). However, for the
most part, the Supreme Court has rejected the use of direct public opinion surveys in
favor of legislative enactments and jury sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (declining to use public opinion polls in the eighth
amendment context); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (legislation weighs
heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510,519 n.15 (1968) (one ofthe most important functions a jury performs is maintaining a link between community values and the penal system).
377. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Notably, Justice
Brennan once rejected the notion of public executions in dicta:
Our concern for decency and human dignity, moreover, has compelled
changes in the circumstances surrounding the execution itself. No longer
does our society countenance the spectacle of public executions, once
thought desirable as a deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we
reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
378. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 187 n.35; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
788 (1982).
379. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173.
380. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83.
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Supreme Court precedent, the two penological goals that the
death penalty serves are deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders and retribution. 381 While the Court has noted that
some studies suggest that "the death penalty may not function as
a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties,"382 the
Court has been willing to defer to the judgments of the state
legislatures in this area. 383 The death penalty fulfills its retributive purpose "by providing an institutional means for society to
express its moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct, and
by satisfying society's desire that criminals receive the punishments they deserve."384
To satisfy the human dignity principle, a punishment also
must be proportionate to the severity of the crime. If an offender
receives more punishment than he deserves, then the punishment is considered disproportionate. 385 In Coker, for instance,
the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is always disproportionate to the crime of rape because rapists do not take their
victims' lives. 386 Likewise, in Enmund v. Florida, 387 the Supreme
Court held that capital punishment is excessive for the crime of
robbery.388 Thus, in considering the constitutionality of a particular punishment, courts must weigh the punishment's severity
against the degree of harm done to the victim. 389
B.

Implications for Private Execution Statutes
Because statutes passed by elected representatives are first
among the "objective indicia" used to measure society's evolving
standards with respect to criminal punishments, one might suspect that televised executions violate the Eighth Amendment.
For, with legislators from every state with capital punishment
having enacted private execution laws, televised executions

381. ld. at 182-83.
382. ld. at 185-88.
383. See, e.g., id. at 185-86 ("The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.").
384. Vanor, supra note 376, at 765 (footnote omitted).
385. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
386. ld. at 584.
387. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
388. ld. at 797-801.
389. Vanor, supra note 376, at 764.
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appear to violate society's evolving standards. Indeed, when
coupled with public opinion polls decidedly against televised executions,390 dicta from Justice Brennan's 1972 opinion in
Furman v. Georgia 391 seems particularly compelling: "Today we
reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all. "392
However, this viewpoint ignores two important considerations. First, legislative enactments cannot always be taken at
face value. Legislators have many motives for passing legislation, and an act outlawing televised executions should not necessarily be taken as evidence that society finds such executions
"cruel and unusual punishments." Indeed, historical research
indicates that private execution statutes were enacted primarily
in response to pressure from death penalty abolitionists in the
1830s. 393 Furthermore, if public executions are truly "cruel and
unusual punishments," it seems odd that death row inmates are
requesting such executions. After all, why would anyone invite
a cruel and unusual punishment?
Thus, especially where death row inmates urge televised executions, such executions cannot be viewed as "cruel and unusual punishments." If this is so, then what is the rationale for
private execution statutes? Are they paternalistic regulations intended to protect the general public from viewing such spectacles? Or, even more deviously, are they an attempt to hide the
way in which government administers justice?
As a practical matter, private execution statutes were originally enacted for two reasons: (1) paternalism, and (2) fear on
the part of death penalty proponents. 394 Thus, while some legis390. See supra note 50. Significantly, the Supreme Court has noted that "any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as
popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment." United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990).
391. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
392. Id. at 297; see also Shuman v. State, 578 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Nev. 1978), vacated
sub nom. Shuman v. Wolff, 571 F. SUpp. 213 (D. Nev. 1983), affd 791 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1986), affd sub nom. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (Zenoff, C.J., concurring) ("Public televising of executions might serve some deterring value; yet even
supporters of the death penalty shudder at the thought of watching an execution.").
393. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 29 (women and non-elites were excluded from attending executions after the enactment of private execution laws). Notably, opponents of capital
punishment in the 1830s may have legitimately believed that the elimination of public
executions would lead to the total abolition of the death penalty. See MASUR, supra
note 10, at 113 ("Only in the l840s did [opponents of capital punishment] begin to
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lators on both sides of the capital punishment debate may want
to shield people from watching executions, at least some death
penalty proponents undoubtedly believe that televising executions will only increase opposition to the death penalty.395 In
either case, neither rationale provides a legitimate governmental
interest necessary to validate private execution statutes.
Interestingly, if the Supreme Court seriously considers the
jurisprudence of Trop and its progeny, granting the public the
right to witness executions may be the only way for the Court to
properly measure the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." To wit: If elected representatives are to be used as the primary "objective indicia" of the
evolving standards, all such representatives - and, more importantly, the people who elect those representatives - must have
realize their error. The abolition of public executions not only left capital punishment
intact, it also neutralized the argument that the spectacle of execution disordered society."); id. at 117 ("[T]he elimination of public executions had deprived opponents of
capital punishment a critical argument: that such spectacles demoralized the
population.").
395. One social scientist has argued that "flawed" or "botched" executions could
lead to the abolition of the death penalty. See Herb Haines, Flawed Executions, the
Anti-Death Penalty Movement, and the Politics of Capital Punishment, 39 Soc.
PROBLEMS 125, 127 (1992) ("[1]f flawed executions seem to be occurring with some
regularity, or if abolitionists are able to turn them into vivid symbols of the death
penalty's inherent immorality, they may come to threaten the institution of capital
punishment itself."). Historical evidence indicates that public outrage over bungled
executions may have led to the abolition of the death penalty in at least two states. Id.
(citing evidence from Wisconsin); Black, Botched Execution Did in Death Penalty,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, May 12, 1990, at 8A (citing evidence from Minnesota). Furthermore, evidence indicates that a series of botched hangings in New York
during the 1880s may have led to the adoption of a more "humane" form of capital
punishment: the electric chair. See Haines, supra note 395, at 127. That televised
versions of botched executions could have a significant impact on public opinion is
reinforced by the frequency of botched executions. See Michael L. Radelet, Post
Furman Botched Executions, LIFELINES, No. 50 (1990), at 7 (classifying 12 of approximately 150 post-Furman executions as "botched"); see also Richards & Easter, supra
note 57, at 399-400 (citing evidence of botched executions in Florida and Texas); cf.
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1087 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the gruesome nature of electrocution). Obviously, a televised execution of an innocent person
could have an even greater impact on public opinion. Cf. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael
L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STANFORD L. REv.
21 (1987) (suggesting that at least 139 innocent people were sentenced to death in the
United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 23 of these people were actually put to
death); Alabama Death Row Inmate Is Set Free, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar.
3, 1993, at 7A (a man condemned to death over four years earlier released because of
his innocence).
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full access to information regarding capital punishment. 396 If
not, each time the Supreme Court employs "evolving standards
of decency" in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court will be
getting an inaccurate measure of such standards. This could result in the Court declaring some punishments acceptable, when
society - if fully informed - would find such punishments
"cruel and unusual." Under the same principle, some punishments could be declared unconstitutional, when society would
approve of such punishments if adequately informed.
Two death penalty cases, Furman v. Georgia 397 and Gregg v.
Georgia,398 demonstrate this hypothesis at work. In 1972 in
Furman, the United States Supreme Court struck down state
death penalty statutes fraught with unbridled jury discretion. 399
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan concluded that the
death penalty's "rejection by contemporary society is virtually
total."400 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan focused
on the history of "successive restriction[s]" on capital punishment and the "increasingly rare" application of the penalty.401
However, the public's "backlash" to Furman was severe, with
thirty-five states reenacting death penalty legislation in "a virtual stampede. "402
Thus, when the Court in Gregg upheld a death sentence
four years later, Justices Powell, Stevens, and Stewart readily
conceded that the state reenactments had "undercut" Furman's
premise: "It is now evident that a large proportion of American
society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction."403 Despite this concession,
however, Justice Marshall insisted that "the American people,
[it] fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its
liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally unaccept396. This is especially true in states like California, where citizens have the opportunity to vote on referendums with respect to capital punishment. See Plaintifrs Trial
Brief at 16 n.18, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rptr. 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(No. C90-1383RHS).
397. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
398. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
399. Furman. 408 U.S. at 238.
400. Id. at 305.
401. Id. at 299.
402. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 65 (1980).
403. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 179.
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able."404 In particular, Marshall stressed that the constitutionality of capital punishment turns "on the opinion of an informed
citizenry," and that, therefore, "even the enactment of new
death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive."40s
In his book, Death Penalties, Raoul Berger criticizes Justice
Marshall's approach. Rejecting the notion that "statutes must
yield to Marshall's speculations as to what the people would do
if informed of data Marshall deems decisive," Berger relies on
the philosopher Sidney Hook to support his position.406 According to Hook, "It is arrogant [to assume that] some self-selected
404. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall continued:
In Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the
information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and
concluded that if they were better informed they would consider it shocking,
unjust, and unacceptable..•• A recent study, conducted after the enactment
of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know
little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public
would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of the consequences
and effects of the death penalty.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 360-69
and Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 171).
405. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Social
science studies have shown that the general public lacks knowledge about the death
penalty and that information about capital punishment often changes attitudes with
respect to the death penalty. See generally Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty
Opinion, 1936-1986: A Critical Examination of the Gallup Polls, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT REsEARCH 130-37 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991); Robert M. Bohm et aI., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall
Hypotheses, 28 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 360 (1991); Robert M. Bohm, The Effects of
Classroom Instruction and Discussion on Death Penalty Opinions: A Teaching Note, 17
J. CRIM. JUST. 123 (1989); James O. Finckenauer, Public Support for the Death Penalty: Retribution as Just Deserts or Retribution as Revenge?, 5 JUST. Q. 81 (1988);
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views ofAbolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116
(1983); Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 404, at 171; Neil Vidmar & Tony Dittenhoffer,
Informed Public Opinion and Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 43 (1981); Robert M. Bohm, Death Penalty Opinions: A Classroom Experience
and Public Commitment, 60 Soc. INQUIRY 285 (1990). But see Charles G. Lord et a!.,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 2098 (1979)
(concluding that information or knowledge about the death penalty polarized opinions, instead of changing them from in favor to opposed or vice versa). For a social
science study exploring the relationship between public opinion and retribution in the
context of the death penalty, see Robert M. Bohm, Retribution and Capital Punishment: Toward a Better Understanding ofDeath Penalty Opinion, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 227
(1992).
406. RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 126 (1982).
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elite can better determine what the best interests of other citizens
are than those citizens themselves."407 However, in the context
of private execution laws, Berger's criticism of Justice Marshall
can be turned on its head. For, by continuing to deprive the
public of vital information regarding capital punishment, private
execution statutes embody the paternalism that Hook so vehemently rejects. Ironically, unless televised executions are allowed, the public may be denied access to the very information
which Justice Marshall deems so decisive.
In today's society, the influence of television cannot be underestimated. Roper surveys since 1964 list television as
America's number one news source,40S and "it cannot be denied
that television news coverage plays an increasingly prominent
part in informing the public at large of the workings of government."409 Indeed, speaking in the trial context, Justice Harlan
once mused that "televising [trials] might well provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to
the public."410 A growing number of cable television stations
407. SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 29 (1980).

408. See Charles E. Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Criminal Trials and Due
Process, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 157, 174 n.74 (1982) (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION,
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MAss MEDIA: A TwENTY YEAR
REVIEW, 1959-1979». The average adult in the United States spends more than
thirty hours each week watching television. A.C. NIELSEN CO., NIELSEN REpORT ON
TELEVISION 8 (1990). Furthennore, 69% of such adults acquire most of their news
from television. Rod Granger, Cable Viewers Want Big 3, Study Finds, ELECTRONIC
MEDIA, May 6, 1991, at 8 (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION, "America's Watching:
Public Attitudes Towards Television"). While the combined circulation of the three
major news magazines-Time, Newsweek, and u.s. News and World Report-is just
over ten million, television news reaches over 200,000,000 viewers in the United
States. See OXBRIDGE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., THE STANDARD PERIODICAL DIRECTORY 1127-28 (13th ed. 1990); VANDERBILT TELEVISION NEWS ARCHIVE, TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS (Jan. 1976 - Dec. 1987). Only two percent of
the population gets its news from sources exclusive of television. TIOlRoper Report,
"America's Watching: 30th Anniversary, 1959-1989, at 27. Televising executions is of
added importance because thirteen percent of U.S. citizens are either illiterate or functionally illiterate. Richard Weizel, From New Words, New Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1992, § 13CN, at 1 (citing United States Department of Education statistics).
Moreover, Americans regard television as the most complete and unbiased source of
news. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION
AND OTHER MEDIA: A TwENTY-FOUR YEAR REVIEW 4 (1983).
409. Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (electronic media have a right to be included in the press pool for
"limited coverage" of White House events); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive presence").
410. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 531, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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such as CNN and C-SPAN-providing live, extended coverage-promise to make television an even more potent medium
for news dissemination.
Given television's tremendous impact on society, televising
executions will undoubtedly influence the capital punishment
debate. Some proponents of capital punishment may switch
sides after viewing an execution, and some death penalty opponents may be persuaded, after watching an execution, that capital punishment is not so bad after all. 411 Whatever the impact of
televised executions, though, society's attitudes regarding capital
punishment will change.412 Additionally, the infusion of information into the death penalty debate may alter society's views
on related matters. For example, society may develop a consensus regarding the most humane form of capital punishment (i.e.,
hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas or lethal
injection}.413
411. A recent public opinion poll asked whether viewing an execution on television
would make people more in favor of the death penalty, less in favor, or wouldn't it
change their mind. While 14% of respondents felt that viewing an execution would
make them more in favor of the death penalty, 36% felt that it would make them
more opposed to capital punishment. Forty percent believed that a televised executions wouldn't change their minds, while 10% weren't sure. See Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut (1991) (WESTLAW, POLL
database). For more than two decades, public opinion surveys consistently have
found that two-thirds of the population favors capital punishment. FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 15 (1986).
412. Cj. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 404, at 195 (a study concluding that exposure
to information about the death penalty changed the subjects' attitudes). Anita Hill's
Congressional testimony and the Rodney King video amply demonstrate the impact
of television coverage with respect to public discourse on issues like harassment in the
workplace and police brutality.
413. See Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment
Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96 (1978);
Angeja, supra note 124, at 1514-16 (arguing that televised executions may develop
societal consensus regarding the most humane form of capital punishment); see also
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-88 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented from a denial of certiorari where the defendant had
claimed that use of the electric chair constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth amendment); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1241 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from a denial of certiorari where
the defendant had claimed that use of the gas chamber constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment).
That more information about the method of inflicting capital punishment may
change attitudes about the most humane form of punishment is supported by an execution that took place in Arizona just prior to Robert Alton Harris' execution in
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Because jury determinations are also an "objective indicia"
of "evolving standards of decency,"414 a jury should be allowed
to view an execution film at the defendant's request. This would
assure that jury determinations at the sentencing phase do
California. The gas chamber execution in Arizona, which took place on April 6, 1992,
was described by witnesses to the execution, including media representatives, as a horrible occurrence. See Gruesome Death in Gas Chamber Pushes Arizona Toward Injections. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, at 9. Immediately after the execution, the Arizona
Attorney General called for the abandonment of that mode of execution and efforts
were made in the state legislature to amend the law. See Reinhardt, supra note 132, at
219; Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 132, at 267. But compare id. at 269-70 ("Nor
does the subsequent opinion of the Arizona Attorney General, who is merely one
government official, demonstrate the necessary consensus within Arizona that the gas
chamber is an inappropriate mode of execution. . . . The pendency in the Arizona
legislature of a bill to change that state's mode of execution also does not make Harris'
claim [of 'cruel and unusual punishment'] more plausible, because the law authorizing
use ofthe gas chamber in Arizona remains on the books.") with id. at 270 n.70 (noting
that a recent amendment in California gives capital defendants a choice between the
gas chamber and lethal injection).
Significantly, the increased debate that televised executions would spur might
also affect the public's views with respect to (1) the monetary costs of administering
the death penalty, (2) the appropriateness of capital punishment for juveniles, and (3)
the appropriateness of capital punishment for the mentally or physically impaired.
See Dorothy O. Lewis et al., Psychiatric. Neurological. and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States. 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838
(1986) (a study of 15 death row inmates finding that all 15 "had histories of severe
head injury, five had major neurological impairment, and seven others had other, less
serious neurological problems"). Aside from the myriad issues surrounding the death
penalty that televised executions would also stimulate debate about, increased news
coverage associated with televised executions might also publicize the racial bias in
capital sentencing decisions. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).
414. As the Supreme Court has previously observed, "the jury ... is a significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
519 n.15 (1968) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion):
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal systema link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."
To the extent that prospective jurors opposed to the death penalty can be excluded from jury panels, the Supreme Court's decisions in Witherspoon and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) are inconsistent with the eighth amendment
principle that punishments must not violate the "evolving standards of decency" because the jury panel does not fully reflect community values. Cj Morgan v. Illinois,
112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (a defendant in a capital case has a constitutional right to
remove potential jurors who would automatically vote for execution in the event of
conviction).
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"mark the progress of a maturing society." Indeed, it is hard to
imagine information more relevant to a capital sentencing decision than an execution film. For, along with balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a crime at the
sentencing phase, juries must also fashion the punishment to fit
the crime. In this respect, not only is viewing an execution film
relevant to a jury's sentencing decision, but the unconstitutionality of disproportionate punishments demands that a jury be allowed to view such a film. After all, how can a jury assess the
appropriateness of capital punishment without knowing how the
death penalty is administered and how such a sentence affects both physically and psychologically - a person on death row or
in the execution chamber?
Additionally, allowing juries to view execution films is fully
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Beginning with Lockett v. Ohio 41S in 1978, the Court has consistently held that the
Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer not be precluded
from considering any mitigating evidence in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty.416 Although Lockett dealt with evidence regarding the defendant's character and the circumstances
of the offense, given the "qualitative difference" between the
death penalty and other punishments,417 defendants should be
allowed to present execution film footage as mitigating evidence
415. 438 u.s. 586 (1978).
416. According to the precise language of the Lockett plurality, "the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 114-15 (1982) (A majority of the Court held that "[t]he sentencer, and the [state
appellate court] on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating
evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their
consideration."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 679 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Eight members of the Court agree that Lockett remains good law ....").
417. See, e.g., CaIifornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination."); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
(plurality opinion) (The "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls
for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed."); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion) (because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
605 {"Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different
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during the sentencing phase. 418 Indeed, dissenting in Thompson
v. Oklahoma,419 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
White suggested in dicta that no constitutional violation occurred where color photographs of a victim were introduced at
the sentencing phase of a capital murder case.420 If color photographs of a victim - such as the ones in Thompson "showing
gunshot wounds in the head and chest, and knife slashes in the
throat, chest and abdomen" - are "probative" and not "unduly
infiammatory,"421 then an execution film can hardly be considered irrelevant to a jury's sentencing decision.
As to Trop's admonition that a punishment not offend the
"dignity of man," filming an execution, even over the death row
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.").
418. Prosecutors opposed to the introduction of such evidence are likely to argue
that execution footage is only intended to create sympathy for the accused. However,
mercy is often considered an appropriate element for the jury to consider when deciding whether to impose a death sentence. See Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Instructions to Jury: Sympathy to Accused as Appropriate Factor in Jury Consideration, 72
A.L.R.3d 842 (citing cases). As one commentator has stated:
[C]hoosing whether another is to live or die is a disturbing and daunting
moral challenge. This decision should not be made purely by following rules
or by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rational decision
procedures imply that no one has really made a choice, and that implication
is one which is not acceptable in a supposedly moral society. Empathy and
emotion are properly injected into decisions about capital punishment.
Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99
YALE L.J. 389,409 (1989) (footnote omitted). Compare California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538 (1987) (an instruction requiring jurors to ignore "mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" was not unconstitutional) with Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 509-10 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (an
instruction requiring jurors to "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion,
prejUdice or other arbitrary factor" should be declared unconstitutional because it
forbids the jury from taking into account any evidence that evoked a sympathetic
response) and id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("sympathy" is "an important ingredient in the Eighth Amendment's requirement of an individualized sentencing determination) and Cisarik v. Palos Community Hosp. 579 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. 1991)
(pennitting use of day-in-the-life video in medical malpractice action).
419. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The Supreme Court in Thompson held that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old boy violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
420. [d. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because of the Court's disposition of the
eighth amendment issue, the Court in Thompson did not address the issue of whether
photographic evidence that a state court deems erroneously admitted but harmless at
the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights by virtue of being admitted at the penalty phase. [d. at 838 n.48.
421. Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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inmate's objection, would not violate this principle. First, televised executions would arguably make a measurable contribution to the accepted goals of punishment. In this regard, the
words of Chief Justice Burger in Richmond Newspapers are particularly significant: "When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows.
Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion."422 Finding the "keystone" of open
criminal trials to be "the therapeutic value of open justice, "423
Chief Justice Burger stated as follows:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante
the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice
done - or even the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic
aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark;
no community catharsis can occur ifjustice is "done in a comer [or]
in any covert manner...424

According to Chief Justice Burger, "[T]he appearance of justice
can best be provided by allowing people to observe it. . .. People
in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. "425 Thus, not only are televised executions
consistent with retributive theory,426 but such events would ar422. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (citation
omitted).
423. Id. at 569.
424. Id. at 571 (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959».
425. Id. at 572. In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), where
the Court held that access to voir dire proceedings outweighed the state's interest in
protecting the privacy of prospective jurors in a capital case, Chief Justice Burger
reiterated the "community therapeutic value" in openness. According to Burger:
"When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice
system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and
emotions" like "retribution." Id. at 508-09.
426. See generally Bruce Beddow, Retributive Theory and Public Executions 8
(Nov. 30, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) ("[T]here is no better way to feel that justice is being done, than to see it being done." (emphasis in original». Notably, some
commentators argue that retributive theory does not require capital punishment, with
some suggesting that the death penalty is immoral under retributive principles. See
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 223-49 (1979); HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE (1976); Robert A. Pugsley, A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1501 (1981); M.
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guably further the principle of deterrence. 427 Finally, televised
executions are not disproportionate to the crimes that death row
inmates commit, especially considering the heinous nature of
many of those crimes.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the past, constitutional challenges to private execution
statutes have focused primarily on the right of the press to attend executions. In Garrett v. Estelle 428 and Keams-Tribune v.
Utah Board of Corrections,429 for example, broadcast journalists
challenged restrictions on the filming of executions on Equal
Protection grounds. Additionally, challenges have been brought
alleging unlawful prior restraint and a constitutional right of access for the press to attend executions.
However, these constitutional challenges have failed for
several reasons. First, each of these challenges have been unable
to overcome the principle that the government does not have to
give the press special access to information not shared by the
public generally. 430 Second, litigants challenging private execution statutes have tried to use long-standing legal doctrines in
novel and perhaps undesirable ways. For instance, it was argued
in Garrett that the proposed closed circuit television broadcast of
an execution was a "publication" invoking the prior restraint
doctrine. However, the prior restraint doctrine was intended
primarily to prohibit government censorship of information already in the hands of private parties,431 and the journalists
watching the closed circuit broadcast in Garrett never had a
videotape of the execution in their possession. Likewise, in both
Garrett and Keams-Tribune, the plaintiffs brought Equal Protection challenges on the ground that broadcast journalists are fundamentally different than print journalists. Although a
television broadcast is often a more potent medium than a newspaper story, some private execution statutes do not expressly
Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity. and Respect for Persons. 6 LAW & PHIL. 25
(1987); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 26 n.4 (1987).
427. See supra note 1.
428. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
429. 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1353 (D. Utah 1977).
430. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974).
431. See supra Section VII(A).
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provide for the attendance of media representatives. \ Furthermore, states have, to date, successfully countered Equal Protection attacks by throwing up "sham" justifications for private
execution laws, with one state even attempting to exclude all
journalists from executions in an attempt to moot an Equal Protection challenge. 432
To challenge private execution laws more effectively, litigants must question the premise of their attack. Instead of asking if the press has a right to televise executions, litigants must
ask whether the public has a right to witness executions. Indeed,
because states may attempt to stifle press challenges altogether
by allowing no witnesses at all at execution proceedings,433 asking if the public has a right to witness executions may be the
only way to preserve the press' right to attend and televise such
events.
Given the shortcomings of broadcasters' prior restraint and
Equal Protection challenges, litigants must assert that the public
has a constitutional right to view executions. This right should
be rooted in history and should focus on the lack of governmental interests supporting private execution statutes. Similarly, private execution laws should be challenged as impermissible
restrictions on the content of speech.434 Indeed, because the propriety of capital punishment is a political issue43S-and because
private execution laws were originally enacted, and are still
432. See supra Section IV.
433. Recently, in KQED's lawsuit challenging San Quentin's private execution
regulations, the warden of San Quentin, Daniel Vasquez, tried this tactic. Williams,
supra note 107, at A23. In that attempt, Vasquez told a reporter that he changed the
long-standing policy with Gov. Wilson's approval so that Judge Schnacke could not
rule that since reporters are allowed to attend executions they should be allowed to
use the tools of their trade. Rosenfeld, Warden Afraid ofRevenge on Guards if Executions on TV, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, at AS. However, in his ruling, Judge
Schnacke decided that all reporters could not be excluded from witnessing executions.
KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323,2324 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
434. In particular, it could be argued that the media should be given "effective"
access to executions under Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Houchins. See
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
435. Capital punishment has become a critical issue in many elections throughout
the United States. See Tao, supra note 80, at 1042 n.4 (citing articles). For example,
in a Gallup poll taken after the 1988 election, the death penalty was given as a very
important issue in deciding for whom to vote for fifty-seven percent of Bush voters
and thirty-eight percent ofDukakis vot~rs. George Gallup, Jr. & Alec Gallup, "Public Support for Death Penalty is Highest in Gallup Annals" (1988).
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maintained, for paternalistic reasons or to impede the debate
surrounding capital punishment-private execution laws should
be strictly scrutinized under the First Amendment. Ultimately,
decisions about whether to broadcast executions should be left in
the hands of journalists, just as the general public must decide
whether to watch executions. The government should not be
given the right to decide what is appropriate television viewing
or what is appropriate for journalists and editors to broadcast.
In assessing the constitutionality of private execution statutes, the history of public executions cannot be emphasized
enough. For, as illustrated in the death penalty and the right of
access to trial cases, members of the Supreme Court often employ historical analyses in reaching their decisions. And, while
the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, by definition, could have had no intent regarding televised executions,
this fact does not render history irrelevant. 436 On the contrary,
for the ardent originalist, the one fact that would be relevant is
that the framers approved of large crowds of people watching
executions. Although this fact may not carry much weight for
the nonoriginalist, it does not inhibit the Supreme Court from
finding a constitutional right of access to executions. 437
436. The fact that televised trials are not permitted in some federal and state courts
does not preclude the finding of a public right to witness televised executions. Simply
stated, the reasons given for excluding cameras in the courtroom---disruption of the
proceedings and the potential effect of cameras on jurors, witnesses and judges---do
not apply in the execution context. Furthermore, 44 states currently allow video cameras in the courtroom for various reasons, and the federal courts' policy regarding
cameras in the courtroom is being revised, with the Judicial Conference having already authorized some experimentation. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 512 & n. 14 (1992); see also id. at 510 ("We
live in an era of 'paratexts,' in which words and images, as captured by electronic
recording, compete with print to represent legally significant events.").
437. In Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion
that "the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information." Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Because the United States, until the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, had a long tradition of unrestricted public access to executions, the notion
that the public has a right to view executions is particularly strong. Indeed, the public's right to receive information has been frequently recognized by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 367-68 (1990); Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,756 (1976); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301,
308 (1965).
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Regardless of judicial philosophy, however, an historical
approach based upon more than the framers' intent, provides a
compelling argument for finding private execution statutes unconstitutional when coupled with the jurisprudence of the First
Amendment and Trop v. Dulles. 438 Truly ascertaining the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" only can be realized through robust debate. Furthermore, the government cannot be allowed to stop the natural
evolution of debate on a public issue by privatizing conduct, especially on an issue as important as the death penalty.439
According to historians, a primary reason that executions
were privatized was a powerful movement to abolish capital
punishment in the 1830s.44O If this is so, by reducing the availability of information to the public regarding capital punishment,
state governments engaged in a "cover-up" beginning in the
nineteenth century. Although the continuation of public executions may not have resulted in the abolition of the death penalty,
it is reasonable to assume that the public's perception of the
death penalty would be different today if the United States had
continued the practice of public executions. In order for society
to continue its evolution on the capital punishment issue-either
pro or con-it is imperative that broadcast journalists, acting as
representatives of the people, be allowed to televise executions.

438. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
439. Currently, there are over 2,500 inmates on Death Row. Mark Hansen, Final
Justice: Limiting Death Row Appeals, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 64. Furthennore, the
debate surrounding capital punishment will become even more significant if Congress
expands the use of the death penalty through federal crime bills. See H.R. 3371, 102d
Cong. 2d Sess. (1992); 138 CONGo !tEc. S3939 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Biden) ("This bill adds 53 death penalty offenses-the single largest expansion of
the Federal death penalty in the history of the Congress.").
440. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375; see also MACKEY, supra note 18, at 115-19
(1982) (containing a discussion of how abolitio$ts opposed private execution statutes
in New York).

